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THE FEDERAL NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
AND THE POST-DESEGREGATION CIVIL
RIGHTS AGENDA
JAMES S. LIEBMAN* AND CHARLES F. SABEL*
Despite many deficiencies, the No Child Left Behind Act
("NCLB" or "Act") extends to the federal level and diffuses to the
states an innovative system of publicly monitored decentralization
of school governance known as the "New Accountability." This
Article argues that, given background changes in the
understanding of effective classroom teaching, accountability
systems of the type imposed by the NCLB can enable willing
school districts to build the capacity for school-level reform upon
which the ultimate improvement of public schooling depends. It
claims further that activists can accelerate the reforms and ensure
respect for the requirements of racial and economic fairness by
using the accountability handholds the NCLB provides as tools
for a new civil rights strategy. By officially documenting racially
disparate impacts, and by distinguishing similarly situated schools
and districts that reduce these disparities from those that do not,
the Act authoritatively defines many of the worst existing
disparities as avoidable and, therefore, invidious. The Act thus
can trigger just the kind of locally, experientially, and consensually
generated standards whose absence in the past has kept courts
from carrying through with their initial commitments to
desegregated, educationally effective schools.
We argue that these emergent standards open new possibilities to
courts adjudicating the constitutional acceptability of public
schools in the light of the NCLB. Rather than following Brown v.
Board of Education in attempting by themselves to set the rules
* Simon H. Rifkind Professor, Columbia Law School. B.A., 1974, Yale College;
J.D., 1977, Stanford Law School.
** Maurice T. Moore Professor, Columbia Law School. A.B., 1969, Harvard College;
Ph.D., 1978, Harvard University.
*** We gratefully acknowledge the assistance, suggestions, and criticism of Jack
Boger, Tony Fong, Jay Heubert, Hank Levin, Gary Orfield, Julissa Reynoso, Bill Simon,
Bill Taylor, Amy Stuart Wells, and Tiffany Wong. The research on which this Article is
based is supported by a generous grant from the Hewlett Foundation. We would like to
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for constitutionally sufficient behavior, courts can follow the
innovative decisions of, for example, the Texas Supreme Court in
developing a form of judicial review through which judges
superintend articulation of justiciable standards by those most
directly concerned with the reconstruction of classrooms, schools,
and school districts. This new form of judicial review could
supplant Brown as a new pattern for judicial protection of
positive, social rights and for the judicial supervision of complex
institutional reform that due respect for such rights may require.
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INTRODUCTION
In declaring state-mandated segregation of the races in schools
unconstitutional, Brown v. Board of Education' transformed
American schools and established the judiciary as a principal
protector of the constitutional rights of minorities bereft of political
defense.2 In the manner of all fundamental Supreme Court decisions,
Brown may be considered a "soft" constitutional amendment or a
quasi-national consent decree. A central premise was that, in the
words of one current commentator, "public education is a privilege of
American citizenship."3 This conclusion followed from the principle
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. For a recent discussion of Brown's importance, see Jack M. Balkin, Brown as
Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S
TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 3-
25 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID]
(discussing Brown's status as a judicial "icon").
3. Bruce Ackerman, Ackerman, J., concurring, in WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE
SAID, supra note 2, at 100, 101. Among the many commentators who have interpreted
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"of equality of membership in the civil community," in the words of
another.4
If Brown may be seen as having clarified the Constitution, then
the recently enacted No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB" or
"Act"),5 and the national education reform movement and the
judicial innovations from which it grows, may be seen as clarifying
Brown in two closely related ways. First, the NCLB emphatically
specifies that American citizenship entails not just the privilege of
access to public schools on formally equal terms but also the privilege
of an adequate education.6 Second, it requires that the definition of
adequacy be set and periodically revised through a process organized
by the states and the engaged actors (parents, teachers, principals,
Brown to recognize a fundamental interest in a public education that, in the wake of
segregation, the states could provide to blacks students only by giving them the same
education as white students are BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 246-47 (1980); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 161-63 (1987);
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 172-73 (1984); Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 90, 98-101 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) [hereinafter SHADES OF BROWN];
Robert Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra, at 20,
26-27; Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 588-89 (1965); Charles Lawrence, "One More River to
Cross"--Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to Reshaping New
Remedies, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra, at 48, 51-52; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent
in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1133 (1989); Peter M. Shane, School
Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041,
1084-85 (1984).
4. Frank I. Michelman, Michelman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, in WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 2, at 124, 124.
Commentators who have interpreted Brown to identify "equal citizenship" as a core
constitutional principle include C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality:
Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1030-48 (1980), Charles
L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1960),
Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term: Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7, 34-36, 42 (1976), Paul Gewirtz,
Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 728, 729 (1986), and Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term: Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1977).
5. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-
6578). The NCLB was introduced by the Bush Administration and adopted by Congress
in 2001 with bipartisan support. See Ronald Brownstein, Bush Moves to Reposition
Republicans on Education, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A12.
6. See infra notes 25-86 and accompanying text (discussing the understanding of an
adequate education that underlies the New Accountability movement in American public
education).
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and superintendents) and subject to continuing, comparative review
by the federal government and the public at large.7
Because the NCLB, along with many other deficiencies,'
provides no real enforcement mechanism,9 it may well fall to the
courts, as in the period following Brown, to enforce the many
obligations of school officials that are rendered justiciable by the Act.
To do so, however, the courts will have to abandon the practice,
adopted in the wake of Brown and with limited success, of setting
rules for constitutionally acceptable behavior. Instead, following the
lead of recently innovative state supreme courts and the logic of the
NCLB itself, other courts will have to develop a form of judicial
review in which they superintend the articulation of justiciable
standards by those most directly concerned with the reconstruction of
classrooms, schools, and school districts." The Act triggers this
process by requiring school officials routinely to document racially
disparate impacts and to distinguish similarly situated schools and
districts that reduce these disparities from those that do not. Doing
so authoritatively defines many of the worst disparities as avoidable
and, therefore, invidious."' The NCLB thus encourages the
development of just the kind of locally, experientially, and
consensually generated standards whose absence in the past has
discouraged courts from carrying through with their initial
commitments to desegregated, educationally effective schools. 2 For
7. See infra notes 25-86 and accompanying text (describing how the meaning of an
adequate education is refined by the governance and decisionmaking mechanisms that
characterize the New Accountability movement).
8. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text (discussing the weakness in the
NCLB). See generally CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT
GEORGE W. BUSH'S EDUCATION PLAN 7-17 (2001) (criticizing several aspects of
President Bush's education proposals as limiting educational opportunities), available at
http://www.cccr.org/BushPlan.pdf.
9. See infra notes 76-86, 103 and accompanying text (detailing weaknesses in the
NCLB, particularly in its enforcement mechanisms).
10. See infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas Supreme
Court's innovative role in the development of school reform standards in that state).
11. See infra notes 25-86, 144-68 and accompanying text (describing the reformed
governance systems contemplated by the NCLB).
12. See generally Jay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms: Developments,
Lessons, and Prospects, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 1, 1-38 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) [hereinafter LAW
AND SCHOOL REFORM] (documenting the recent unwillingness of the courts to pursue
desegregation policies to the conclusions compelled by their underlying principles);
Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and
District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623 (2003) (same). For evidence of the courts'
debilitating concerns that court-ordered desegregation interferes with local control,
requires action beyond the educational expertise of judges and even educators themselves,
1706 [Vol. 81
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closely related reasons, this Article argues, the NCLB can also serve
activists as the foundation for a new civil rights strategy that seeks
racial justice directly through increasingly equitable educational
outcomes, rather than indirectly through racial balance.13
Part I of this Article describes the broad movement for school
accountability that underpins the NCLB and explains why the Act
removes two jurisprudential obstacles to court engagement with
educational reform. Part II presents the relevant features of the
NCLB itself. Part III addresses the objections that the NCLB
surreptitiously opens the door to privatization of currently public
schools or to deregulation of the controls on federal funding for
education. The privatization worry, we claim, overlooks the
and lacks public support, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 69-70 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cautioning against transforming desegregation
into a hands-on structural remedy); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-105 (1991) (arguing that courts lack the
public support and enforcement capacity needed to bring about meaningful legal and
institutional reform); Donald R. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1287 (arguing that courts lack the
expertise and control over the range of activities competing for public funding and
government attention that are needed to achieve effective institutional reform); infra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's doubts about federal
district courts' capacity to manage broadscale reform of school systems).
13. See infra notes 128-62 and accompanying text. The NCLB and its associated
reforms also invite school personnel and activists sympathetic to desegregation to
demonstrate that schools and districts with mixed populations do better by desegregating
their classrooms than similar but segregated districts. Desegregation would thereby set
the benchmark that other strategies must reach. See, e.g., CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, WILL TITLE t LEAVE No CHILD BEHIND? 42-45 (2002) (noting prospects for
parents and advocates to use the New Accountability as a lever for requiring districts and
schools to improve the educational outcomes of poor and minority children), available at
http://www.temple.edu/CPP/rfd/WillTitlelLeaveNoChildBehind.pdf; James S.
Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
(forthcoming June 2003) (manuscript at 98-99, 109-12, on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (discussing several initiatives, at least partly focused on desegregation,
proposed by civil rights and community activists that were triggered by and relied upon
data and comparisons generated by New Accountability regimes in Kentucky and
nationwide, which aim to close achievement gaps between white and black and male and
female students); William L. Taylor, Title I as an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation
and Equal Educational Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1751, 1755-62 (2003) (suggesting
that civil rights groups use provisions of the NCLB permitting children in failing public
schools to transfer to other public schools as a mechanism to achieve desegregation and
educational improvement on behalf of poor and minority children); Ann Majestic,
Address at the North Carolina Law Review Symposium: The Resegregation of Southern
Schools? (Aug. 30, 2002) (describing a comprehensive plan in operation in the Wake
County (North Carolina) School District to desegregate students on the basis of economic
status and test scores in order to improve the educational outcomes of poor and minority
children).
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enormous costs of shortchanging the public school system, while the
deregulatory worry overlooks the possibility of using the NCLB's
disclosure requirements to control local discretion.
Parts IV and V consider the additional objections that the NCLB
overestimates the capacity of states and schools to meet the demands
the Act places on them, and that the Act diverts public attention from
the goals of the Civil Rights Movement. In Part IV, we argue to the
contrary that experience to date suggests that state and school
capacity can be built simultaneously with the reforms the NCLB
contemplates and with the help of those reforms. Part V argues that,
far from diverting attention from a vindication of civil rights, the Act
provides an opportunity to revivify and give new direction to a series
of community organizing and litigation strategies pioneered by the
Civil Rights Movement. We conclude that the NCLB affords an
unexpected and welcome second chance to respond to the claim of
some prominent civil rights advocates that the Movement
subordinated the struggle for better educational opportunities for
minorities to an effort to racially balance the schools.
I. THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY
The NCLB is informed by an innovative system of publicly
monitored decentralization of school governance,14 crystallized in
Clinton Administration initiatives in 1994," that is commonly referred
to as the "New Accountability."16 The New Accountability resulted
14. See generally CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 24-46
(describing the basic structure and content of the "No Child Left Behind" legislation).
15. Id.; see, e.g., MICHAEL COHEN, THE ASPEN INST., IMPLEMENTING TITLE I
STANDARDS, ASSESSMENTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: LESSONS FROM THE PAST,
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE (2002) (discussing implementation of the 1994 legislation
and its relationship to the "No Child Left Behind" legislation), available at http://www.
edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/Cohen.pdf; see also Paul Weckstein, Social Reform and
Enforceable Rights to Quality Education, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 12, at
306, 308-10 (explaining the framework for school reform adopted by Congress in 1994).
16. See SUSAN H. FUHRMAN, THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY (Consortium for Policy
Research in Educ., Pol'y Briefs No. RB-27, 1999); DIANE MASSELL, STATE STRATEGIES
FOR BUILDING CAPACITY IN EDUCATION: PROGRESS AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES
(Consortium for Policy Research in Educ., Res. Rep. Series No. RR-41, 1998); DIANE
MASSELL ET AL., PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE: STANDARDS-BASED SYSTEMIC REFORM
IN NINE STATES (Consortium for Policy Research in Educ., Pol'y Briefs No. RB-21, 1997);
New American Schools' Standard of Quality for Design-Based Assistance (Nov. 1999)
(draft, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (setting out standards that are
followed by a nonprofit school improvement organization that is aligned with the New
Accountability movement and providing assistance to reforming schools). We sketch out
the attributes of the New Accountability below, infra notes 17-57 and accompanying text,
and describe it in greater detail in Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 59-99).
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from the mutual transformation of two apparently contradictory
clusters of piecemeal reforms. 7  The first cluster-minimum
standards and high-stakes testing-went in the direction of increased
centralization, even nationalization, of the public school system. Its
central element was a drive to set minimum standards for school and
student performance at the state and federal levels, to rank pupils and
schools accordingly, to deny promotion and diplomas to persistently
failing students, and to reconstitute persistently failing schools.'8
Advocates of such high-stakes testing hoped that the penalties of
failure would induce both individuals and institutions to improve
their performance. 9
17. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 194-201 (1990) (claiming that the contradictory impulses to
improve school bureaucracies doom reform efforts within public educational institutions);
Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti, Introduction to CITY SCHOOLS: LESSONS FROM
NEW YORK 1, 8 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2000) [hereinafter CITY
SCHOOLS] (noting the same contradiction between these same two impulses in the context
of particular reforms in New York City public schools).
18. See WILLIAM H. CLUNE ET AL., THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF HIGH
SCHOOL GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS: FIRST STEPS TOWARD CURRICULAR REFORM
(Consortium for Policy Research in Educ., Res. Rep. Series No. RR-011, 1989) (describing
state legislative and administrative attempts in the 1980s to reform public educational
systems through high-stakes testing and more demanding curricula); NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, HIGH STAKES TESTING FOR TRACKING, PROMOTION, AND GRADUATION 15
(Jay P. Heubert & Robert M. Hauser eds., 1999) (assessing the role of standardized tests
in reforming schools); THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1980s:
PERSPECTIVES AND CASES (Joseph Murphy ed., 1990) (collecting articles addressing
numerous aspects of educational reform movement of the 1980s); Jennifer Hochschild &
Bridget Scott, The Polls-Trends, Governance and Reform of Public Education in the
United States, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 79, 87 (1998) (analyzing recent trends in American
educational reform); Richard J. Murnane & Frank Levy, Will Standards-Based Reforms
Improve the Education of Students of Color?, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 401, 412-14 (2001)
(reaching a cautiously optimistic conclusion about the ability of standards-based reforms
to change incentives and trigger meaningful improvements in American public education);
Aaron Saiger, Note, Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational
Inadequacy, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1830, 1853-64 (1999) (proposing reform strategy based
on states' power to disestablish entire school districts); Chris Pipho, Tracking the Reforms,
Part 5: Testing-Can It Measure the Success of the Reform Movement?, EDUC. WK., May
22, 1985, at 19 (pointing out that "[n]early every large education reform effort of the past
few years has either mandated a new form of testing or expanded uses of existing
testing").
19. By high-stakes tests, which are to be distinguished from what we are calling the
New Accountability, we mean "tests that states and school districts use in deciding
whether individual students will receive high school diplomas or be promoted to the next
grade." Jay P. Heubert, High-Stakes Testing in a Changing Environment: Disparate
Impact, Opportunity to Learn, and Current Legal Protections 1 (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (taking a nuanced view of
standardized testing as potentially beneficial if used diagnostically and in connection with
other educational improvements but as harmful if high-stakes consequences are
emphasized). For a careful examination of high-stakes testing regimes, see Jay P.
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The second cluster-the professionalization, site-based
management, and chartering of schools-went in the direction of a
new localism. Its key element was the devolution of authority for
classroom instruction away from state education administrations and
toward districts, principals, teachers (especially those professionally
mortified by the rigidities of the traditional system), and sometimes
parents. Other elements included increased willingness by
educational authorities to allow teachers and parents to create new
schools, particularly small and specialized ones, within the public
system, and to allow parents to send their children to schools outside
the assigned catchment area.20
As these two sets of reforms intersected, they changed in
complementary ways. High-stakes testing, it became clear to many
close observers, was not a reliable measure of the performance of
either individual pupils or of institutions. Often, the incentives
created were perverse-teaching to the test, or excluding from the
testing pool those vulnerable students most in need of help-and
poor and minority students were penalized for the failings of
institutions over which the students and their parents had no
substantial control.2 Above all, the results of the test provided little
Heubert, High-Stakes Testing and Civil Rights: Standards of Appropriate Test Use and a
Strategy for Enforcing Them, in RAISING STANDARDS OR RAISING BARRIERS?:
INEQUALITY AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 179 (Gary Orfield &
Mindy L. Kornhaber eds., 2001) [hereinafter RAISING STANDARDS OR BARRIERS].
20. See WILLIAM H. CLUNE & PAULA A. WHITE, SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT:
INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1-3 (Consortium for Policy Research in Educ., Res. Rep. Series No. RR-008, 1988); PAUL
T. HILL ET AL., HIGH SCHOOLS WITH CHARACTER 57-82 (1990); PRISCILLA
WOHLSTETTER & NOELLE GRIFFIN, CREATING AND SUSTAINING LEARNING
COMMUNITIES: EARLY LESSONS FROM CHARTER SCHOOLS 4-8 (Consortium for Policy
Research in Educ., Occasional Paper Series No. OP-03, 1998); Jane L. David, School-
Based Decision Making: Kentucky's Test of Decentralization, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 706,
706-12 (1994); Pearl Rock Kane, The Difference Between Charter Schools and Charterlike
Schools, in CITY SCHOOLS, supra note 17, at 65; Tom Loveless & Claudia Jasin, Starting
from Scratch: Political and Organizational Challenges Facing Charter Schools, 34 EDUC.
ADMIN. Q. 9, 14-15 (1998); Molly O'Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the
"Deregulated" Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137, 152-74 (2000); Sharon Elder, The
Power of the Parent, YALE MAG., Oct. 1990, at 50, 53.
21. See ALFIE KOHN, THE CASE AGAINST STANDARDIZED TESTING: RAISING THE
SCORES, RUINING THE SCHOOLS 40 (2000); LINDA M. MCNEIL, CONTRADICTIONS OF
SCHOOL REFORM: EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF STANDARDIZED TESTING 153-271 (2000);
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 178-79; SUSAN OHANIAN, ONE SIZE FITS
FEW: THE FOLLY OF EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS 1-127 (1999); John Jacob Cannell,
Nationally Normed Elementary Achievement Testing in America's Public Schools: How
All 50 States Are Above the National Average, 7 EDUC. MEASUREMENT: ISSUES & PRAC.
5, 6-9 (1988); M. Gail Jones et al., The Impact of High-Stakes Testing on Teachers and
Students in North Carolina, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 199, 200-02 (1999); Linda McNeil &
1710 [Vol. 81
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or no indication of how to reorganize ineffective schools or to aid
those students who did not measure up. In response to these
criticisms, a new class of diagnostic standards emerged with the
express aim of using tests both to direct local reform and to orient
pedagogic attention to individual students.22
The new localism contributed to the development of these
diagnostic standards and pioneered methods of using disaggregated
testing data as a tool of self-assessment.23 In so doing, however, the
movement for professional regeneration and control had to give up its
initial antipathy to assessments and acknowledge the need for
professionals to be accountable for ensuring not just that teachers
taught well but that students (especially poor and minority students)
actually learned. This insight led in turn to the recognition that
accountable professionalism required new forms of peer monitoring
and transparent outcome measures. 2
4
The New Accountability emerged from this joinder of diagnostic
standards and accountable professional pedagogy. In the best cases,
this recombination of reform has resulted in a system of education
that turns the traditional school topsy-turvy. The teacher's job is no
longer to execute instructions set at the state or district level, but
rather to collaborate with colleagues in monitoring the learning
strategies of individual students and the teaching strategies of peers,
Angela Valenzuela, The Harmful Impact of the TAAS System of Testing in Texas: Beneath
the Accountability Rhetoric, in RAISING STANDARDS OR BARRIERS, supra note 19, at 127,
129-50; D. Monty Neill & Noe J. Medina, Standardized Testing: Harmful to Educational
Health, 70 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 688, 689-92 (1989).
22. See MASSELL ET AL., supra note 16, at 2-9 (providing an overview of the
standards-based reform movement and the drift from punitive to diagnostic measures).
For a helpful critique of performance standards used in isolation and a guide to using them
diagnostically, see COMM. ON TITLE I TESTING AND ASSESSMENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, TESTING, TEACHING AND LEARNING: A GUIDE FOR STATES AND
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 22-101 (Richard F. Elmore & Robert Rothman eds., 1999); see also
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 39-40) (discussing the difference between
diagnostic and punitive standards).
23. See infra notes 26-28 (detailing the role of self-assessment in locally focused
educational reforms).
24. See RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, INVESTING IN TEACHER
LEARNING: STAFF DEVELOPMENT AND INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT IN
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 24 (1997) (quoting an interview
with Anthony Alvarado, Superintendent of Schools, District 2, New York City, Nov. 15,
1995); KATE MALOY, BUILDING A LEARNING COMMUNITY: THE STORY OF NEW YORK
CITY COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2 15-16 (May 1998), available at http://www.lrdc.
pitt.edu/hplc/publications/building%20portrait.pdf; Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13
(manuscript at 41-59).
25. See sources cited supra notes 16, 22.
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and to help correct difficulties as they arise. 6 The principal's job is to
assure that classrooms and teaching can be organized to facilitate this
collaborative monitoring of students and peers.27  The
superintendent's responsibility is to provide the conditions that
principals need to succeed at that task.28  The state, finally, stops
writing detailed rules and regulations for the operation of schools and
districts. Instead, on the one hand, the state sets and periodically
revises school standards and the means for assessing them. On the
other hand, the state aids schools that are struggling to improve and
when necessary reconstitutes those that persistently prove unable to
do so.
29
The outward face of the New Accountability is a reporting
system in which each district and school publicizes outcomes each
year on shared measures or metrics, not only on average for the
entire institution, but also disaggregated to highlight the outcomes of
its poor, African-American, limited English proficiency, and other
categories of pupils.30  Measures of student outcomes are
26. See RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN
COMMUNITY DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 6-9 (1998) [hereinafter ELMORE &
BURNEY, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT]; RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY,
SCHOOL VARIATION AND SYSTEMIC INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT IN COMMUNITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 3 (1997) [hereinafter ELMORE & BURNEY,
SCHOOL VARIATION].
27. See RICHARD F. ELMORE & DEANNA BURNEY, LEADERSHIP AND LEARNING:
PRINCIPAL RECRUITMENT, INDUCTION AND INSTRUCTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #2, NEW YORK CITY 16-20 (Jan. 2000); ELAINE FINK &
LAUREN B. RESNICK, DEVELOPING PRINCIPALS AS INSTRUCTIONAL LEADERS 8-15
(2000); INST. FOR EDUC. LEADERSHIP, LEADERSHIP FOR STUDENT LEARNING:
REINVENTING THE PRINCIPALSHIP 2-3 (2000); Richard F. Elmore, Building a New
Structure for School Leadership, AM. EDUCATOR, Winter 1999-2000, at 10-13, available
at http://www.aft.org/american-educator/winter99-00/NewStructureWint99_.00.pdf.
28. See ELMORE & BURNEY, supra note 24, at 23-26 (discussing the new role and the
need for district-level support for principals); FINK & RESNICK, supra note 27, at 5-22
(describing the support central administrative staff provide to principals in effectively
reforming schools); MARY KAY STEIN ET AL., OBSERVATIONS, CONVERSATIONS, AND
NEGOTIATIONS: ADMINISTRATOR SUPPORT OF LITERACY PRACTICE 6-7 (Nov. 1998);
Anthony Alvarado, Professional Development Is the Job, AM. EDUCATOR, Winter 1998,
at http://www.aft.org/american educator/winter98/ProfessionalDevelopment.html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
29. For a number of examples of state-level educational activities of this sort, see
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 70-73, 89-96).
30. Texas's accountability system provides an example of the reporting system
characteristics of the New Accountability that we discuss here. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.§§ 39.021-131 (Vernon 1996); see OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, TEXAS
EDUCATION AGENCY, 2000 ACCOUNTABILITY MANUAL: THE 2000 ACCOUNTABILITY
RATING SYSTEM FOR TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS § VII (2000), at
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/account/2000/manual/secO7.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (describing the operation of the Texas statutory and
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continuously revised based on how well or poorly they align with
successful learning, teaching, and organizing. Each district's and
school's strengths and weaknesses are diagnosed by comparing
changes in outcomes among its target populations to improvements
among those populations in all other districts and schools in the state
and especially those that are most economically and ethnically like
themselves.
If districts or schools and their various populations do not
progress at rates consistent with, or better than, the rates achieved at
demographically and economically similar institutions, improvement
plans are devised. Typically, these plans are developed by
professionals working in teams, with input from parents and peer
advisors from coordinate districts and schools. The goal is to identify
underutilized strategies, including ones that have succeeded in similar
institutions elsewhere, and to guide efforts to use them effectively.
Effectiveness is monitored in the same data-driven, outcome-focused
way. If failure recurs, plans are changed based on what works
elsewhere, under threat of sanction if failure persists.
Notably, the emergent structure is not a hybrid combining
elements of the two types of governance structures that are often
assumed to exhaust the available options: traditional hierarchy (in
the public sphere, bureaucracy) and economic or political markets. In
a hierarchy, there is a clear distinction between the superiors who set
the rules and the subordinates who execute them.31 In school systems
reformed on the principles of the New Accountability, rules are in
effect provisional frameworks for action that are corrected at the
urging of "subordinates" in light of their experience "implementing"
those frameworks: ends are revised in light of means and vice versa.32
Markets in theory know neither superiors nor subordinates. They are
governed by purely voluntary choice. Sellers adjust their behavior in
response to buyers' decisions to purchase from them or their
administrative system by which state and local officials and the public monitor
improvement at, and among populations at, schools and districts and intervene with
improvement plans, intensified monitoring, and ultimately, takeovers if progress is not
made). For additional discussion of Texas's accountability scheme and those in other
states and school districts, see Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 70-73, 89-
96).
31. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
329-41 (A. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947) (describing the efficacy of legal
arrangements resting on the principle that one official has the authority to establish a rule
that other members of the bureaucratic administrative staff must obey).
32. For examples, see Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 47-59, 73-78).
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competitors; elected officials respond to the electorate's actual and
anticipated choices between themselves and opposing candidates.
In schools that are reforming along New Accountability lines, on
the contrary, service providers at all levels respond to continuing,
publicly and governmentally facilitated comparisons of their
performance with that of their peers, where the dimensions of the
comparison and the definition of "peer" are themselves subject to
public and governmental discussion and revision.33 In recent writings,
we and other authors argue that the ongoing questioning of
institutional routines that results from the continuing revision of
means and ends in light of comparative assessment of performance is
best understood as an application of philosophical pragmatism.34 This
"continuous improvement" approach to governing institutions is
observable today in contexts as varied as environmental regulation,
community policing, and drug courts, where the problems for public
action have much in common with the problems of school reform.3"
33. See, e.g., MASSELL ET AL., supra note 16, at 7 (describing a process through which
local school districts are disciplined by comparisons of their performance to that of other
districts on state and national standards); THE CHARLES A. DANA CTR., UNIV. OF TEX.,
EQUITY-DRIVEN ACHIEVEMENT-FOCUSED SCHOOL DISTRICTS: A REPORT ON SYSTEM
SCHOOL SUCCESS IN FOUR TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS SERVING DIVERSE STUDENT
POPULATIONS 18-36 (2000) (linking rapidly improving outcomes of poor and minority
students in four Texas school districts to the districts' utilization of governance techniques
associated with New Accountability). For additional examples, see Liebman & Sabel,
supra note 13 (manuscript at 45-59, 73-78).
34. Susan Helper, John Paul MacDuffie & Charles Sabel, Pragmatic Collaborations:
Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443,
443-83 (2000); Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic
Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 137, 138-59 (Neil J.
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994).
35. See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS?(2001) (advocating a system of third-party monitored self-monitoring of overseas working
conditions by corporations operating global supply chains); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998)(describing the potential role of democratic experimentalism in resolving difficult
questions of constitutional interpretation); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug
Treatment Courts and Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000)
(discussing recent innovations in the use of court-monitored treatment plans for drug-
addicted offenders); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 41 (2001) (advocating a system of monitored information collection, sharing, and
comparison among police departments as a means of combating racial profiling); Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001) [hereinafter
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation] (championing the systematic use
of performance monitoring and benchmarking as regulatory tools in the environment and
other areas); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002) (proposing that
NEPA be retooled as a mechanism for progressively redefining government projects to
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This kind of stylization reeks of utopianism. Its vision of a fully
diagnostic and continuously self-correcting system of public education
ignores the persistent enthusiasm of some states for high-stakes
testing; the scattered, but ferociously defended, claim that the public
schools are beyond repair and have to be privatized; and the
unavoidable reality that the nation as a whole is far from the ideal
adumbrated in the New Accountability.36 The account also ignores a
host of more specific objections to the stated and suspected goals of
the New Accountability and doubts about the capacity of educational
institutions to realize those goals-objections and doubts to which
Parts III through V of this Article respond. But based on our close
observation of the New Accountability at work in Texas, Kentucky,
and Community District 2 in New York City-observations we
describe in detail in a companion study37-we are convinced that this
method of organizing schools offers the best hope of improved
educational outcomes for those most neglected by the current school
system. We believe the New Accountability provides this hope both
directly, by triggering a race to the top in educational performance
within the school system, and indirectly, by facilitating political and
legal redress from outside the system for those schools and
populations that do not benefit initially from that race to improve.
Four findings from our companion study are relevant here. First,
when schools are organized to use the results of diagnostic tests to
adjust teaching to individual needs, the performance gaps between
poor and minority students and white and affluent ones become a
matter of explicit public concern and tend to diminish. 31
moderate their environmental effects to the extent currently possible); Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the
New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) (exploring the uses of community-based
planning and monitoring as a method of managing police discretion); Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458
(2001) (advocating a multitiered and interactive "regulatory" framework for use by trial
courts in managing the compliance process in employment discrimination lawsuits). For a
general overview of this literature, see WILLIAM H. SIMON, SOLVING PROBLEMS V.
CLAIMING RIGHTS: THE PRAGMATIST CHALLENGE TO LEGAL LIBERALISM
(forthcoming 2003) (describing a new school of pragmatist thought that advocates
carefully monitored problem-solving, instead of the announcement and enforcement of
fixed entitlements, as the most effective means of reforming social institutions and
responding to the needs of disadvantaged communities).
36. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (noting gaps in the diffusion and
enforcement of the New Accountability).
37. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13.
38. For examples from Kentucky, New York, Texas, and elsewhere, see id.
(manuscript at 54-57, 78-81); sources cited supra note 33.
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Second, the combination of organizational and classroom-level
reforms that constitute the New Accountability can arise in widely
different contexts. For example, New York City's District 2 began as
a movement of professional reform and was gradually transformed
through its encounters with the (changing) standards movement.39
Texas began with a governance reform focused on the kind of
reporting system just described. Within this framework, lead districts
found ways to reorganize schools so as to facilitate the kinds of
instructional practices that had emerged in New York City's District
2.40 Kentucky began with a statewide governance system deeply
informed by the movement for diagnostic standards and is developing
school-level practices that resemble those in District 2 and a reporting
system that resembles the one in Texas.4
Third, initial defects in governance structures and classroom
practices have thus far proven to be addressable within the
deliberately open framework created by the initial round of reforms.42
Sometimes such correction has proceeded at the insistence of a new
type of public advocacy group. These groups are defined by the novel
ways in which they fuse the grassroots mobilization characteristic of
traditional social movements and community-based organizations
39. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 24, 26, 27 (describing the content and evidence
of the success of the District 2 reforms).
40. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 62-70); Julissa Reynoso & Tiffany
Wong, Education Reform: A Case Study of Texas 1-2 (Apr. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
41. Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform
in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 497-98 (1999); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13
(manuscript at 81-89); Jonathan Shafter & Alexander Greenawalt, Education Reform in
Kentucky 9-31 (Apr. 12, 2000) (unpublished research paper, Columbia Law School) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). See generally RONALD G. DOVE, JR., ACORNS
IN A MOUNTAIN POOL: THE ROLE OF LITIGATION, LAW AND LAWYERS IN KENTUCKY
EDUCATION REFORM (1991) (describing the litigation campaign that contributed to
educational reform in Kentucky); Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Reform and
Systemic School Change: Reconstituting Kentucky's Public Schools, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 318
(1993) (reporting the history of Kentucky's systematic education reform); Melissa C. Carr
& Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in EQUITY AND
ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE 136, 155-57 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999)
(explaining the politics of school finance in Kentucky); Bert T. Combs, Creative
Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School Reform Law, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367 (1991)
(relating the history of legal and community organizations that culminated in the
comprehensive revision of the Kentucky public school system); Michael Paris, Legal
Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: Lessons from School Finance Litigation in
Kentucky, 1984-1995, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 631, 646-69 (2001) (describing the
interaction of political mobilization and litigation in achieving educational reform in
Kentucky).
42. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 47-59, 73-78) (providing a
number of examples of this process from New York and Texas).
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with the close involvement in the details of institutional
reorganization that in the past has been confined to professional
reform movements.a3
Fourth, the creation of New Accountability regimes has often
gone hand in hand with the gradual consolidation of a new
relationship between courts faced with educational-reform lawsuits,
standards, and institutional practices. This relation promises to
remove longstanding obstacles to judicial vindication of civil rights in
the context of complex, comprehensive institutional reform. The new
relationship and its innovative potential are clearest in Texas. A
finance-equity suit requesting redistribution from rich districts to
poor ones was presented to the Supreme Court of Texas in 1992.4
After a torturous to-and-fro, the court eventually required the
legislature to establish a system of student assessment geared to
43. For examples of educational reform initiatives undertaken by these new public
advocacy groups, see CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8; ANNE C.
LEWIS, EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, THE COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY
TEAM IN LOUISVILLE: WAKING A SLEEPING GIANT (Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.prichardcommittee.org/pubs/cat/sleepinggiant.pdf; KAVITHA MEDIRATI1A &
NORM FRUCHTER, N.Y. UNIV. WITH CAL. TOMORROW, DESIGNS FOR CHANGE &
SOUTHERN ECHO, MAPPING THE FIELD OF ORGANIZING FOR SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT:
A REPORT ON EDUCATION ORGANIZING IN BALTIMORE, CHICAGO, LOS ANGELES,
THE MISSISSIPPI DELTA, NEW YORK CITY, PHILADELPHIA, SAN FRANCISCO AND
WASHINGTON D.C. (Aug. 2001), at http://www.nyu.edu/iesp/publications/cip/mapping/
mapping-final-report.pdf; RAISING STANDARDS, CLOSING GAPS, FINDINGS FROM THE
CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS TITLE I MONITORING PROGRAM (Spring
2002) [hereinafter RAISING STANDARDS], available at http://www.temple.edu/CPP/rfd/
RaisingStandardsClosingGaps.pdf; RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY, A RIGHT TO
KNOW: A PARENT-TEACHER STRATEGY TO IMPROVE TEACHING AND LEARNING IN
THE PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www.temple.
edu/CPP/content/reports/arighttoknowreport.pdf; ELAINE SIMON & EVA GOLD,
RESEARCH FOR ACTION, CASE STUDY: AUSTIN INTERFAITH, STRONG
NEIGHBORHOODS, STRONG SCHOOLS (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.crosscity.org/
pdfs/cccsite-austin-r.pdf; Anne T. Henderson & Beverly Raimondo, Every Child Counts:
Citizens Tackle School District's Achievement Gap, MIDDLE GROUND, Feb. 2002;
Community Collaborative to Improve [New York City] District 9 Schools, Platform for
Educational Improvement in District 9 (undated draft, on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); Majestic, supra note 13. For a discussion of these initiatives, see Liebman &
Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 98-99, 109-12). See also RUTH S. JOHNSON, USING
DATA TO CLOSE THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP: HOW TO MEASURE EQUITY IN OUR
SCHOOLS xv-xvii, 1-52, 249-70 (2002) (developing both an advocacy strategy for parents
and community members and a data-driven instructional strategy for using test scores and
other evidence of unequal distribution of satisfactory educational outcomes by race as a
basis for closing the "achievement gap" between students on the basis of race, ethnicity,
and gender).
44. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826
S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); see J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama:
An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 608 (1999)
(describing the procedural history of the Texas educational equity lawsuit).
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broadly defined education goals and then to condition the
accreditation of each school district on its progress toward meeting
the goals.45 This dramatically shifted the emphasis of the lawsuit and
the remedy from the definition of inputs to that of outputs. Instead of
simply requiring an equalized or adequate level of financing, the
court required the state to provide an adequate education for each
child. And the court assumed that the definition of adequacy would
emerge from continual revision of the broad goals of education. At
the same time, the decision shifted the role of the court in relation to
the other actors concerned with education and reform. In previous
reform cycles, the courts were unrealistically expected to function as,
in effect, a purpose-built administrative agency, establishing detailed
rules for reformed schools and monitoring compliance with them.46
In its recent school-reform decision, the Supreme Court of Texas has
instead superintended the process by which standards are initially set
by the legislature and the Texas Education Agency, and by which the
performance of schools in meeting those standards-along with the
standards themselves-is continuously evaluated and corrected. 47
These developments address two potentially showstopping
worries about judicial supervision of institutional reform in the name
of constitutional values. The first of these worries is of particular
moment to the redistributivist left; the other is more salient to the
property-minded right. The worry on the left, articulated by Frank
Michelman, among others, is that inequality-based arguments for
45. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 62-70) (discussing Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995)). The court's action in 1995 was
originally suggested in a single justice's separate opinion when the case was previously
before the court in 1992:
An "efficient" education [as required by the Texas Constitution] requires more
than elimination of gross disparities in funding; it requires the inculcation of an
essential level of learning by which each child in Texas is enabled to live a full
and productive life in an increasingly complex world .... [The reasoning of the
court's prior opinions] requires ... the legislature to articulate the requirements
of an efficient school system in terms of educational results, not just in terms of
funding.
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d at 525-27 (Cornyn, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
46. The classic description of these expectations for reformist courts is found in
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976). For a critique, see CHARLES F. SABEL & WILLIAM SIMON, DESTABILIZATION
RIGHTS: HOW THE NEW PUBLIC LAW SUCCEEDS (forthcoming 2003) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
47. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 728-31 & nn. 7, 8 & 10
(Tex. 1995); see also Farr & Trachlenberg, supra note 44, at 670 n.340 (describing the
transformation of the Texas litigation and remedy from focusing on financial equity to
focusing on about educational equity).
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school reform, and social reform generally, are doomed by conceptual
indeterminacy.48  On the one hand, the state could meet a
constitutional obligation to treat all citizens equally by providing all
with none of some good or service, leaving those unable to provide
for themselves no better (or even worse) off than without the right to
equal treatment.49 On the other hand, arguments that the state is
obligated to provide citizens with some level of "minimum
protection"-i.e., with adequate amounts of goods and services
necessary to citizenship (such as education)-although conceptually
sound, seem legally impracticable. As Michelman concludes,
[T]he "advantage" of the minimum protection hypothesis (if
we would so regard it) remains utterly theoretical until (if
ever) we can develop a "justiciable" standard for specifying
the acceptable minimum and the acceptable gap. Absent
such standards, the supposed duty of minimum protection
cannot be directly enforced; in fact, its violation cannot even
be coherently alleged. Evidently, some notion of equality or
nondiscrimination is needed to provide a foothold for
litigants and judges intent upon defining a grievance and
fashioning a remedy."
Below we argue that the new standards and the institutional
architecture that generates them help resolve this problem by fleshing
out the abstract requirement that schools ensure adequate outcomes
for all students with a working, corrigible definition of the actual
practices by which they can do so. 1
The corresponding concern on the right, often expressed in the
opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist, is that court-ordered
institutional reform untethered from doctrinal constraints will violate
the bedrock principle of private law that remedies be directly
deduced from infringed rights.52 In Missouri v. Jenkins,53 for example,
it was precisely this argument that underlay Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court, which overturned several central components
of a wide-ranging program of educational reconstruction that the
48. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term: Foreword. On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV, 7, 57-59 (1969).
49. Id. at 11.
50. Id. at 57.
51. See infra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
52. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87-102 (1995); see, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (limiting school desegregation remedies to curing the
"incremental segregative effect" of the precise violation that was proved); see also
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (barring multidistrict remedy for violation
occurring within a single school district).
53. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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district court had ordered in connection with a desegregation suit.5 4
In doing so, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited, with approval, a lower
court judge's complaint that "this case, 'as it now proceeds, involves
an exercise in pedagogical sociology, not constitutional
adjudication.' 55
The New Accountability helps effective court-sponsored
educational reform avoid this criticism as well. The new standards
and the associated accountability regime substantially reduce the
possibility for judicial caprice by giving substance to the
interpretation of rights and remedies that courts previously could not
derive from doctrine alone.56 To continue with the Texas example, a
constitutionally inadequate education comes to mean an education in
which particular schools are not closing achievement gaps between
any identifiable, poorly performing subpopulation and the best-
performing groups, where outcomes at other comparable schools
show this improvement to be possible 7.5  The remedy is accordingly
for the laggards to adopt strategies with effects equivalent to those
pursued by the leading schools and districts.
The successes, broad adaptability, and capacity to reenlist the
judiciary in the cause of school reform that the New Accountability
has thus far demonstrated require that attention be paid to efforts to
place that reform at the center of the nation's program for renovating
its public schools. The NCLB is, in our view, just such an effort. The
remainder of this Article defends this view against reasonable
criticisms, and tries to show how engagement with the Act can
provide civil rights advocates with new and effective tools for
significantly improving the educational outcomes of poor and
minority children.
54. Id. at 97-103.
55. Id. at 83 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 404 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J.,
dissenting)).
56. SABEL & SIMON, supra note 46 (manuscript at 6-8).
57. Closing such gaps will often involve improving the performance of poor and
minority children in relation to affluent and white ones, but in theory a rich white group, if
it was somehow being systematically disserved by its school, could ultimately come under
the protection of the act as well. Thus if any identifiable group, or any school as a whole,
no matter how well endowed, fails to improve at a pace commensurate with that achieved
at other, comparable schools, the affected parents and children will have recourse to many
of the same remedies-improvement plans, community activism, and public outcry-as
other parents and children have.
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The NCLB was inspired by developments in Texas. 8 It inherits
from that state the attractively transparent governance structure of
districts and schools that exemplify the New Accountability. It also,
however, inherits Texas's inattention to mechanisms by which states,
districts, and schools can share effective practices and learn directly
from one another. Despite its defects, we think the NCLB provides
important handholds for improvement.
For the most part, the NCLB imposes obligations on states and
local education agencies ("LEAs"), typically school districts, that
receive federal funds under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965. 59 Those funds are directed to schools with the
highest proportions of low-income families.6° Under the NCLB,
58. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 5 (describing how the development of the NCLB
by George W. Bush's Presidential Administration was influenced by the reform efforts in
Texas while he was Governor).
59. Title I is an $8 billion per year program created as part of Lyndon Johnson's War
on Poverty in large measure as a consequence of the Civil Rights Movement. GARY
ORFIELD & ELIZABETH DEBRAY, EDUCATION FOR THE POOR: LESSONS FROM NEW
RESEARCH ON THE U.S. PROGRAM TO AID CONCENTRATED POVERTY SCHOOLS 1-2
(2000) (paper prepared for research conference on Poverty and Education in the
Americas, Harvard University, May 3-4, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The core idea of Title I was to make supplemental funds available to schools
serving the most impoverished children so the schools could provide assistance that the
pupils' families and their schools could not. Originally, much of the money went to highly
specialized programs directed to students judged to have different kinds of learning
disabilities. Categorizing students in this way, with the result that they were often
required to leave their regular classes to receive additional services, has more recently
been found to be disruptive to the point of being counterproductive. Accordingly, when
Title I was reauthorized in 1994, it was amended to give state and local educators more
discretion to use funds for purposes they defined in the name of "whole school reforms."
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 1002(g)(2), 1502, 108
Stat. 3518, 3522, 3604-3605 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6302(g)(2), 6492 (2000));
see Weckstein, supra note 15, at 314-18. In return Congress, imposing the bargain that
was repeatedly attempted in this period but was only brought to fruition by the 2001
reauthorization, encouraged states (albeit ineffectually) to adopt accountability systems,
created test-based improvement standards of its own, and insisted on increased evaluation
and monitoring of results. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, §§ 1001-1119, 108
Stat. at 3519-3557 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6320 (2000)); see Tammi J.
Chun & Margaret E. Goertz, Title I and State Educational Policy: High Standards for All
Students?, in HARD WORK FOR GOOD SCHOOLS: FACTS NOT FADS IN TITLE I REFORM
120, 120 (Gary Orfield & Elizabeth H. DeBray eds., 1999) [hereinafter HARD WORK FOR
GOOD SCHOOLS]; Gary Natriello & Edward L. McDill, Title I: From Funding Mechanism
to Educational Program, in HARD WORK FOR GOOD SCHOOLS, supra, at 31, 35;
Weckstein, supra note 15, at 324-41.
60. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, §§ 1113-1115, 115
Stat. 1469, 1469-79 (2002) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6313-6315). Based on their
proportions of low-income children, some schools qualify for funding for schoolwide
programs. See id. § 1114, 115 Stat. at 1471. Others qualify only for programs providing
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states must: set "challenging academic content standards" and
"student academic achievement standards" defining an adequate
education for all schools and students in the state;61 create annual
standardized tests in literacy and mathematics (and, subsequently,
science) in grades three through twelve that are aligned with those
standards; 62 report the results of performance on these tests and other
valid indicators for individual schools and for all relevant ethnic and
socioeconomic subpopulations within those schools; 63 set goals for
"annual yearly progress" ("AYP") so that students in all the relevant
subpopulations can be expected to meet the state standard of
adequacy within twelve years;6 require LEAs to present annual
"report cards" ranking the performance of each of the relevant
subpopulations at all of their schools on the state's tests;65 integrate
these activities into a broader accountability system for assuring that
schools and school districts meet these obligations to provide an
adequate education to all subpopulations;66 along with LEAs, provide
technical assistance premised "on scientifically based research" to
schools that have persistently failed to meet their AYPs, including
through state-organized peer-support teams of master teachers;6 and
provide academic achievement awards for schools that "significantly
services to low-income children within otherwise nonqualifying schools. See id. § 1115, 115
Stat. at 1475. Still other schools do not qualify for any funds at all, because the school's
proportion of children from low-income families is lower than the proportion in the
district as a whole. See id. § 1113, 115 Stat. at 1469.
61. Id. § 1 111(b)(1)(A), 115 Stat. at 1444 (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311); see infra
notes 94-103 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on the capacity of states to
avoid the requirements of the NCLB by adopting weak standards or watering down
existing standards).
62. Id. § 1111(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 1449.
63. Id. §§ 1111(b)(2)(C)(v), ll(b)(2)(G)(iii), 1111(b)(2)(I), 1111(b)(10), 115 Stat. at
1446, 1448, 1454. For thoughtful discussions of the diagnostic value of, but also the
technical difficulties posed by, disaggregating educational outcomes and measuring success
in regard to a variety of ethnic, socioeconomic, and developmentally defined groups-and
of the need, even given the disaggregation, to assure that individual children are not lost in
the averages-see DAVID FIGLIO, AGGREGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Feb. 13,
2002), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/Figlio.pdf; RICHARD J.
WENNING ET AL., No CHILD LEFT BEHIND: WHO IS INCLUDED IN NEW FEDERAL
ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS (Feb. 13, 2002), available at http://www.edexcellence.
net/NCLBconference/Wenning%20Herdman%20and%2OSmith.pdf; Thomas J. Kane et
al., Randomly Accountable, EDUC. NEXT, Spring 2002, at 57, available at http://www.
educationnext.org/20021/56.pdf; Lynn Olson, Testing Researchers Make Pitches for
Refining ESEA Rules, EDUC. WK., Sept. 25, 2002, at 10.
64. § 111 l(b)(2)(B)-(G), 1111(b)(2)(1), 115 Stat. at 1446-48.
65. Id. §§ 1111(c)(1), 1111(h), 115 Stat. at 1454,1457.
66. Id. § IIll (b)(2), 115 Stat. at 1445-49.
67. Id. §§ 1111(c)(3), 1111(c)(4), 1116(b)(4), 1117, 115 Stat. at 1455, 1482, 1498-1501
(to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 63t1, 6316, 6317).
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closed the achievement gap" between students from different ethnic
groups.6
Each year, LEAs are required to use the results of the annual
statewide standardized tests and other indicators to review the
progress of each of their schools and each of the school's relevant
subpopulations under the improvement criteria set by the state.69
LEAs must
publicize and disseminate the results of the local annual
review ... to parents, teachers, principals, schools, and the
community so that the teachers, principal, other staff, and
schools can continually refine, in an instructionally useful
manner, the program of instruction to help all children
served under this part meet the challenging State student
academic achievement standards established under [the
Act]. 70
Schools that fail to meet their obligations must present a plan for
doing so. 71 Parents and staff must actively participate in the planning
process. 2  In presenting the Act, the Bush Administration has
explicitly characterized it as a " 'flexibility for accountability'
bargain. '73  The states receive substantial flexibility in combining
funds received under various federal programs. In return, the states
must discipline schools and LEAs that fail to improve at an
acceptable rate.74 Schools that fail to meet their annual improvement
goals for five years must be completely reconstituted under a
restructuring plan that may include the engagement of private
management companies to take over failing schools.75 Students in
schools that fail to meet state improvement standards for two
consecutive years may transfer to a different public school of their
choice located in the same LEA, with transportation provided by the
LEA.76 Schools that fail to meet state improvement standards for at
68. Id. § 1117(b)(1)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 1500.
69. Id. § 1116(a), 115 Stat. at 1478-79.
70. Id. § 1116(a)(1)(C), 115 Stat. at 1478-79.
71. Id. § 1116(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 1480-82.
72. Id. § 1118(a)(2)(A), 115 Stat. at 1501.
73. U.S. Dept. of Educ., The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001: Executive Summary,
at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/esea/exec-summ.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
74. §§ 1116(b), 1116(c), 115 Stat. at 1479-91.
75. Id. § 1116(b)(8), 115 Stat. at 1485.
76. Id. §§ 1116(b)(1)(E), 1116(b)(9), 1116(b)(10), 115 Stat. at 1479, 1486. The Act
requires LEAs to use up to twenty percent of their Title I allocations to pay for
transportation in support of choice options, or to fund supplemental educational services,
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least three of the four preceding years must permit all their low-
income students to use federal funds to which the schools and their
LEAs would otherwise be entitled to purchase supplemental
education services; these services may be obtained from any
accredited public or private sector providers chosen by the students
and their parents.77
Although the NCLB establishes these detailed obligations for
schools and districts to report their performance and progress, it fails
to establish in any corresponding detail the federal government's own
responsibilities to monitor and foster these developments and to
sanction LEAs that do not meet their obligation to improve
educational outcomes. 78  To receive funds under the flexible
provisions of the NCLB, the state educational agency must do little
more than submit a consolidated plan setting forth how its
challenging academic content standards, test regime, and so forth will
be constituted and implemented as "a single statewide state
accountability system that will be effective in ensuring that all local
education agencies, public elementary schools, and public secondary
schools make adequate yearly progress as defined [by the NCLB]. 79
The Secretary of Education then has only 120 days from the
submission of the plan to convene a peer review process and, based
on the resulting recommendations, demand necessary modifications.8"
Because many states will submit initial plans nearly simultaneously
during 2003,81 it seems unlikely, except in cases of willful and blatant
defiance of statutory provisions, that the Secretary will closely
scrutinize state plans.
Statutory provisions for the subsequent review of plans deemed
acceptable, and other forms of monitoring and oversight, are
nonexistent, and the NCLB has next to no discussion of enforcement.
If a state fails to meet any requirement of the NCLB, "the Secretary
may withhold funds for State administration ... until the Secretary
for students assigned to schools that have failed to meet their improvement goals for the
requisite period. See id. §§ 1116(b)(9), (10), 115 Stat. at 1479.
77. Id. §§ 1116(b)(5), 1116(e), 115 Stat. at 1482-83, 1491-94. The operational details
for these remedial mechanisms are still being worked out.
78. For a discussion of the kinds of assistance and monitoring the federal government
ought to be providing, see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
79. § 1111(b)(2)(A), 115 Stat. at 1445-46. See generally id. § 11l1, 115 Stat. at 1444-62
(setting out the standards for state plans).
80. Id. § 111.(e), 115 Stat. at 1456.
81. See Letter from Rod Paige, Secretary of Education, to State Education Officials,
at http://www.ed.gov/News/Letters/020724.html (July 24, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (noting that "States will be required to submit their AYP for
review at the beginning of 2003").
[Vol. 811724
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
determines that the State has fulfilled those requirements. '82  The
only mandatory enforcement mechanism is triggered when a state
fails entirely or in a timely manner to put "in place" the "challenging
academic content standards and student achievement standards, and
a system for measuring and monitoring adequate yearly progress"
that we describe above.83 In that event, "the Secretary shall withhold
25 percent of the funds that would otherwise be available to the State
for State administration under this part."' 4 Except for this single
mandate in response to a state's unlikely failure even to pretend to
comply, all the important matters are left to the discretion of the
Secretary of Education in regulations that thus far have served to
relax, not stiffen, the NCLB's monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. 85  The NCLB thus offers little hope of ending the
Department of Education's (and the predecessor Department of
Health, Education and Welfare's) long history of weak enforcement
of federal requirements for school reform.86
III. REASONS FOR SUSPICION ABOUT THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
ACT AND RESPONSES
The NCLB's insistence on school improvement, in combination
with its disinclination to monitor, let alone enforce, its own
accountability provisions raise suspicions for some that the Act is a
Trojan horse for nefarious political designs. Others, while not
doubting the good faith of the Bush Administration and Congress,
82. § 1111(g)(2), 115 Stat. at 1457.
83. Id. § 1111(g)(1)(A), 115 Stat. at 1457; supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
84. § 1111(g)(1)(A), 115 Stat. at 1457.
85. See Lynn Olson, Long-Awaited ESEA Rules Are Released, EDUC. WK., Aug. 7,
2002, at 1; Erik W. Robelen, Senate Panel Examines Ed. Department Efforts to Enforce
New ESEA, EDUC. WK., May 1, 2002, at 24; Diana Jean Schemo, Schools Face New Policy
on Transfers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at A26; see also infra note 103 (describing the
Department of Education's limited statutory authority to bar states from diluting their
educational standards in order to inflate the number of evidently successful schools).
86. E.g., COHEN, supra note 15, at 10-11. According to Professor Cohen:
No one believes the Education Department will really enforce Title I
requirements.... The fact of the matter is that the Education Department does
not have a strong track record of compliance monitoring of [Elementary and
Secondary Education Act] programs, and hasn't for decades spanning
-Administrations of both parties. There is a widespread view that the
Department has few effective sanctions to apply, since no one believes that it will
ultimately withhold funds from states or local districts ... [and because] it lacked
both the staff capacity and clear focus to pay attention to the most important
requirements.
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fear that the legislation will have disastrous unintended consequences
for the public schools and especially their poor and minority pupils.
For those adopting the suspicious reading of the NCLB, its
"accountability-for-flexibility bargain" is a sham. Either the states
are getting flexibility without giving anything in return-in which case
the NCLB amounts to the deregulation of federal funds spent on
education, which in turn delivers students, particularly poor and
minority students, into the hands of selfish local oligarchsS7-or, the
standards and accountability system are real enough, but are not
actually intended to achieve reform. The suspicion in this latter event
is that the NCLB's true purpose is to speed privatization by exposing
the incapacity of schools and districts to meet their annual
improvement goals.88
The concerns about disastrous unintended consequences go to
the capacity of the states and schools to advance reform under the
conditions established by the NCLB89 and to the fear that the Act will
undercut the nation's remaining commitment to desegregation.9" The
suspicious interpretations of the NCLB do not, we think, stand up to
scrutiny. The reasons for rejecting those suspicions in turn help
limit-but do not fully banish-concerns about state and school
87. E.g., Dan Goldhaber, What Might Go Wrong with the Accountability Measures of
the "No Child Left Behind Act"?, Paper presented at the Conference on "Will No Child
Truly Be Left Behind? The Challenges of Making this Law Work," at http://www.
edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/Goldhaber.doc (Feb. 13, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (discussing fears that states will be able to game the system without
achieving meaningful results, especially for poor and minority children).
88. Inveterate opponents of public education consider that failure to be inevitable.
E.g., Abigail Thernstrom, Comments in response to papers prepared for Conference on
"Will No Child Truly Be Left Behind? The Challenges of Making this Law Work," at
http://www.edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/Thernstromcomments.doc (Feb. 13, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
89. Articles arguing that the ambitious demands of the NCLB doom many schools
and districts to failure because of their lack of institutional capacity to reform include
Richard F. Elmore, Unwarranted Intrusion, EDUC. NEXT, Spring 2002, at 31, available at
http://www.educationnext.org/20021/30.pdf; Kane, supra note 63, at 57; Matthew Gandal,
Multiple Choices, How Will States Fill in the Blanks in Their Testing Systems?, Paper
presented at the Conference on "Will No Child Truly Be Left Behind? The Challenges of
Making this Law Work," at http://www.edexcellence.net/NCLBconference/Gandal.doc
(Feb. 13, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
90. See John Charles Boger, Education's "Perfect Storm?" Racial Resegregation, High-
Stakes Testing, and School Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1375,
1449-50 (2003). But see Taylor, supra note 13, at 1755-62 (arguing that the NCLB
provisions that permit students in poorly performing schools to transfer to more successful
schools at state expense provides an important new mechanism for racially desegregating
schools with predominantly white student bodies).
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capacity for reform and also about the effects of the NCLB on the
ongoing campaign for racial equality.
We begin with the reading of the NCLB as a shill for
privatization. In focusing on long-term consequences, this suspicion
overlooks the enormous and probably self-limiting political
disruption that punitive use of the accountability system would almost
surely provoke. Recall that the first obligation of LEAs with schools
failing to meet their improvement goals is to provide more local
choice among schools. Districts with poorly performing schools may
be forced to provide space for poor and minority students in
presumably richer and whiter schools within the district and to pay to
transport them there.9 The political costs of transferring small
numbers of students in a few districts scattered across the state may
be containable. But the pressures released by the failure of schools in
many districts statewide would be incalculably great-especially if the
ferment in the cities implementing this part of the NCLB in its first
year of operation is any guide.92 Given the great flexibility accorded
states in setting standards and annual improvement goals, the more
91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. For an argument that this provision
provides a potentially powerful tool for civil rights advocates, see Taylor, supra note 13.
92. When it was signed into law by President Bush with the "vow[] to free 'children
trapped in schools that will not change and will not teach,' . . . students in 8,652 chronically
low-performing schools" were given the option "to jump ship," forcing "school districts
[to] scramble to accommodate thousands of students eligible to seize that option,"
including nearly 125,000 pupils in the Chicago district alone. Mary Lord, The New School
Choice: Suddenly, Thousands of Students Can Transfer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
5, 2002, at 38. For other articles describing the disruption caused by the transfer
provisions of the NCLB in its first year of operation, see Marjorie Coeyman, Just When
You Thought You Knew the Rules.... CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 9, 2002, at 11;
Derrick Z. Jackson, The Big Lie: "No Child Left Behind," BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2002,
at Al 9; Robert Kelly, Brooklyn Hopes That Parents Will Stick with the District, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 17, 2002, at Bi; Susan Levine, Few Families Seek School Switch in
Montgomery, WASH. POST, June 22, 2002, at B1; Lori Olszewski, Few Pupils Who Sought
Switch Got Their Wish, CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 24, 2002, at 1; Michael Resnick, 'Choice'
Cannot Be Rushed, USA TODAY, July 9, 2002, at A14; Erik W. Robelen, Few Choosing
Public School Choice for this Fall, EDUC. WK., Aug. 7, 2002, at 1; Jen Sansbury, Obstacles
Hold Kids in Bad Schools, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 15, 2002, at Al; Megan Tench &
Anand Vaishnav, Payzant Faults Bush Plan as Impractical: Transfer Rule Called a
Logistical Problem, BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 2002, at B1. Despite strong bureaucratic
pressures to the contrary, the new Chancellor of the New York City School System, Joel I.
Klein, recently issued a statement committing the district to full "citywide"
implementation of the NCLB's transfer provisions. See Press Release, Citywide Public
School Choice Process, at http://www.nycenet.edu/press/02-03/n50_..03.htm (Dec. 9, 2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that the New York City
"Department of Education will establish a citywide public school transfer process for
eligible children under the No Child Left Behind Act" that aims "to provide these
[transfer] options in a more efficient, equitable and cost effective way").
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likely response to this threatened dislocation would be to diminish
these standards or goals, so that widespread failure, and the
privatization to follow, does not occur. 3 Similar reactions are likely
to be triggered by efforts to use the NCLB as nothing more than a
pretext for the imposition or extension of high-stakes testing.
Nor does the availability of these responses validate the
deregulation reading of the NCLB as a mechanism for eventually
freeing local schools and districts from any accountability for their
treatment of students, particularly poor and minority students. This
suspicion, for its part, overlooks the possibility that there is more to
accountability than rule-following. Before the NCLB, school officials
were in compliance with federal requirements if they could document,
for example, that they had provided the number of hours of remedial
education per pupil or of professional development per teacher
required by statute for qualifying schools. At first blush, the grant of
money in the absence of such rules, and hence of any efforts to verify
compliance with them, looks like deregulation. But, as is detailed at
greater length in our companion study of classroom practices in New
York City's Community District 294 and of developments at both the
classroom and district levels in Texas,95 continuous, diagnostic
monitoring of performance can provide a new and different kind of
accountability. These mechanisms not only expose bad actors who do
not do what they are supposed to do-the strength of the traditional
rule-based system-but also rely on experimentation and the
diffusion of its lessons to prove that underperforming professionals at
93. Some such adjustment is already taking place. Schemo, supra note 85; Diana Jean
Schemo, Sidestepping of New School Standards Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A21.
For the reasons why any such dilution of standards is unlikely to succeed over the long
run, see infra note 103 and accompanying text. For sources arguing that large scale
privatization is unlikely for either economic or political reasons, see Henry M. Levin &
Cyrus E. Driver, Costs of an Educational Voucher System, 5 EDuc. ECON. 265, 280-81
(1997) (stating that school choice will never be a comprehensive solution because the cost
of a voucher system of that scale is prohibitive); James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The
Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2085-91 (2002) (arguing that the
preferences of the large numbers of families with children enrolled in suburban school
districts pose a substantial political obstacle to the adoption of comprehensive educational
choice plans because of the families' opposition both to giving up their current public
school subsidy and to large-scale transfers of poor and minority children from urban
schools to their own schools); Henry M. Levin, Thoughts on For-Profit Schools 4-7 (Nat'l
Ctr. for the Study of Privatization in Education, Occasional Paper No. 14, 2001), available
at http://www.ncspe.org/publications-files/7_OP14.pdf (questioning whether there is a
sound basis for expecting for-profit schools to achieve the economies of scale needed to
make them succeed economically).
94. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 45-57).
95. Id. (manuscript at 73-81).
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comparable schools can do what they are supposed to do and to show
them how.
The NCLB rests on these same foundations. The provisions for
information to be presented in the annual state and LEA "report
cards"9 6 are as detailed as the provisions for enforcement 97 (which
immediately precede them in the statute) are scant. Thus, in addition
to reporting the results of standard tests disaggregated by each of the
relevant ethnic and socioeconomic subpopulations, the state report
cards must compare the actual achievement of each of those
subgroups to the state's annual goal for that subgroup. The state also
must report the percentage of students in each group not tested,98 and
must require LEAs to do the same for themselves and for each of
their schools.99 Consequently, the citizens in the state will easily be
able to determine whether all the state's school children are
progressing as desired, and whether some students are being excluded
from the tests with the purpose or effect of inflating scores.
Even more important, parents and students will potentially be
able to make Texas-style comparisons of the performance of their
schools in serving families like them against the performance of
demographically similar schools throughout the district and state.
Moreover, parents and the public nationwide will be able to make
more reliable judgments about the academic performance of
individual states. True, the NCLB requires only that the standards
each state chooses to adopt be "challenging," ' and forbids the
Secretary of Education to impose any particular standard on states as
a condition for approval of its consolidated plan. 0 1 But a separate
provision of the NCLB takes an important first step toward
establishing the comparability of state standards, and thus their
accountability systems. The NCLB does this by requiring all states
receiving Title I money to administer at federal expense the National
Assessment of Educational Progress ("NAEP") in reading and
mathematics to samples of fourth and eighth graders."0 2 If a state's
96. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1111(h), 115 Stat. 1425,
1458 (2002) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311).
97. Id. § 1111(g), 115 Stat. at 1457.
98. Id. § 1111(g)(1)(C), 115 Stat. at 1457.
99. Id. § 1111(h)(2)(B), 115 Stat. at 1458.
100. Id. § 1111(b), 115 Stat. at 1444.
101. Id. § 1111(e)(1)(F), 115 Stat. at 1456.
102. Id. § 1111(c), 115 Stat. at 1454. NAEP is a federally constructed assessment tool
that has been used by the U.S. Department of Education and predecessor agencies since
1969 to provide "results regarding subject-matter achievement, instructional experiences,
and school environment for populations of students (e.g., fourth-graders) and subgroups
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standards are so low that all students are easily proficient, but a
sample of these students shows poorly on this demanding national
diagnostic test, substantial pressure is likely to arise to bring that
state's standards and its students' performance in line with those
elsewhere in the nation. 03
IV. INVIGORATING, NOT INCAPACITATING, EDUCATIONAL
REFORM
A far more substantial concern is that, as currently configured,
schools and states lack the capacity to build an adequate school
governance system and achieve classroom-level reform. Few states
have accountability systems nearly as sophisticated as those in
Texas'04 and Kentucky,0 5 both of which are likely to satisfy many or
most of the NCLB's requirements. As of early 2002, for example,
only sixteen states had the grade-by-grade tests that the NCLB
of those populations (e.g., female students, Hispanic students)." Nat'l Ctr. for Educ.
Statistics, What is NAEP?, at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/ (last visited Apr.
1, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). "Since 1990, NAEP assessments
have also been conducted to give results for participating states. Those that choose to
participate receive assessment results that report on the performance of students in that
state." Id. The NCLB requires states receiving federal money to participate in the NAEP
program but does not require them to use NAEP assessments as their own measure of
educational progress. Just for the Kids, a Texas intermediary organization discussed infra
notes 122-27 and accompanying text, has already begun mapping proficiency levels as
measured on state tests to the proficiency levels defined by NAEP. Nat'l Ctr. for Educ.
Statistics, supra. For example, with regard to the Texas test for fourth grade mathematics,
"the state's passing standard is comparable to the NAEP basic standard but easier than
the NAEP proficiency standard." Just for the Kids, Other States, at http://www.just4kids.
org/us/us otherstates.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
103. In response to reports that states were dumbing down their educational standards
to avoid the full force of the NCLB, e.g., Schemo, supra note 93, Secretary of Education
Rod Paige sent a "blistering warning to school commissioners across the country"
cautioning against efforts to sidestep the intent of the Act. Diana Jean Schemo, States Get
Federal Warning on School Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at A25; see Press
Release, Dan Langan, Letter Released from U.S. Education Secretary Paige to State
School Chiefs on Implementing No Child Left Behind Act, at http://www.nclb.gov/media/
news/102302.html (Oct. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Confirming the weakness of the Act's formal enforcement mechanisms, supra notes 78-86
and accompanying text, but also predicting-and acting to provoke-the public
intolerance for weak standards and results that we anticipate, Secretary Paige called state
officials who water down educational standards "enemies of equal justice and equal
opportunity" and "apologists for failure," and forecast that "they will not succeed"
because, "[o]nce parents discover that children in their local schools are not learning as
well as they could, they will demand results-no matter how much one state tries to buck
accountability." Press Release, supra.
104. See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 39.021-.204 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2003).
105. See KY. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 156.005-.990 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2002).
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requires in reading and mathematics. In only nine of those states are
the tests aligned with curricular standards, as is also required by the
NCLB, and, in any event, is necessary to permit test results to inform
instructional improvements. One estimate is that over two hundred
new state-level tests will need to be created in the next several years
to meet federal requirements. 106  And without an adequate
assessment regime in place, it will be hard for states to set proficiency
levels and annual improvement goals as required by the NCLB.
Given that the U.S. Department of Education is unlikely to provide
much assistance to struggling states,107 it is not unreasonable to worry
that a governance-based reform will fail because the governance it
supposes will not be in place to guide the reform.
The related worry about the lack of capacity for ground-level
reform grows out of the experience of the pioneers of the new
classroom practices, such as New York City's Community District 2.108
The fear here is that even good governance will produce reform only
if schools and districts are already reforming, in the sense of having
made some determination about the need to change themselves and
about the direction change should take. As Professor Elmore puts it:
[I]nternal accountability precedes external accountability.
That is, school personnel must share a coherent, explicit set
of norms and expectations about what a good school looks
like before they can use signals from the outside to improve
student learning.... Low-performing schools, and the
people who work in them, don't know what to do. If they
did, they would be doing it already.109
These worries are hardly frivolous. Many states will have a hard time
implementing an accountability system, and some states will almost
surely fail to do so within the limits imposed by the NCLB, however
leniently interpreted. By the same token, many schools and districts
will have trouble reorganizing to meet the demands placed on them
even by well-designed governance systems, and some will fail.
But the inevitability of these kinds of difficulties diverts attention
from the crucial question: Is the NCLB so demanding in relation to
the limited capacities of states and schools that its implementation is
106. See Gandal, supra note 89, at 1.
107. See supra notes 78-86, 103 and accompanying text.
108. David K. Cohen & Susan L. Moffitt, Title I: Politics, Poverty, and Knowledge, in
THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
77, 87-88 (2001); Richard F. Elmore, Testing Trap, HARVARD MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at
35; sources cited supra note 89.
109. Elmore, supra note 108, at 37.
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more likely to paralyze reforms in the more advanced jurisdictions
than it is to help laggards advance and to improve inducements for
reform at the state and national levels? Answers to this question are
necessarily tentative. But the record of capacity-building detailed in
the account of standards-based reform in New York's District 2 on
the one side, and changes in school and district-organization in Texas
on the other, suggest that these worries are overblown and even
mischaracterize the obstacles to reform.
Consider first the concern with the cultural preconditions for
change. The lesson of District 2 is precisely that the culture of change
is as much a product of change-including especially change in
governance systems-as a precondition for it. District 2 might well
have remained a case of anti-institutional or cultural professional
revolt-with engaged professionals free to run their classrooms and
schools as they saw fit, but without any ongoing evaluation of whether
the results for children were good-had it not been for the
intervention of a new governance regime personified by key
administrators, such as Anthony Alvarado and Elaine Fink.10
Moreover, the decision to adopt this monitoring and assessment
regime was the starting point, not the conclusion, of change. As is
developed in detail in our companion study, District 2 is still figuring
out "what to do"; and school reformers there do their figuring by
trying different things and evaluating the results, not by deducing
actions from settled principles. Indeed, the vicissitudes of culture in
District 2 raise a serious question whether a high level of traditional
professionalism might obstruct reform more than aid it.1 '
In any case, many of the consistently improving Texas districts
do quite well at adopting the team-based diagnosis and response to
individual learning difficulties that are key to the New Accountability
and the success of District 2 without having the latter's progressive
tradition of pedagogy.'12 More exactly, the Texas example supports
110. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 49-54) (discussing RICHARD
F. ELMORE, BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN STANDARDS AND ACHIEVEMENT: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION (2000)); ELMORE &
BURNEY, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT, supra note 26; ELMORE & BURNEY, supra note
27; ELMORE & BURNEY, SCHOOL VARIATION, supra note 26); Elmore, supra note 27.
111. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 45-54).
112. One well-documented example is the Margo Elementary School in the Westlaco
School District in the Rio Grande Valley on the border between Texas and Mexico. A
substantial majority of the school's overwhelmingly Hispanic students is from families
poor enough to qualify for federal lunch subsidies. But ninety-seven percent passed and
eighty percent were proficient on the fourth grade reading test. In math, one hundred
percent passed and seventy-one percent were proficient. The principal attributes much of
the success to "our individual reading program. We ensure that every child in
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two interpretations, both of which belie any showstopping incapacity
for ground-level reform. The first is that there are more, and more
widely diffused, "cultures of reform" than a simple extrapolation of
the District 2 experience would suggest. Although we do not know
how many cultures there are or how widely they are diffused, that is
simply because we have not looked for them. But given the diversity
of the robustly improving Texas districts, it is unlikely that the list of
effective cultures of reform is short or the boundaries very narrowly
drawn. Until they succeeded in improving, for example, the Texas
school districts we have observed, such as Westlaco and its Margo
Elementary School, were not on anyone's list of learning communities
well endowed for robust improvement.'13
A second, compatible interpretation is that it is wrong to think of
capacity as a cultural endowment or community heritage that is either
present or not. Our analysis of Texas shows that many schools and
districts are bootstrapping their way to systemic reform. Changes in
the framework of governance at the state level, such as improvement
goals for racially and economically identified groups of pupils,
kindergarten through second grade reads with a teacher, one-on-one, every day." Daily
progress is carefully monitored, and where there are problems, "I have to find resources
quickly," a first grade teacher says. S.C. Gwyne, How Good Is Your Kid's School?, TEX.
MONTHLY, Nov. 2001, at 124, 126, available at http://www.texasmonthly.com/mag/issues/
2001-11-01/feature-2.php. Another example is the North East School District in San
Antonio. For a collection of materials documenting the effective capacity-building process
in that district, see DIVISION OF INSTRUCTION, NORTH EAST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT, PRINCIPAL'S BRIEF 2002-2003 (undated) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); NORTH EAST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, INSTRUCTIONAL DIVISION
PLAN 2002-2003: GUIDE FOR MEETING THE HIGHER LEARNING STANDARDS (2002)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); NORTH EAST SCHOOL DISTRICT,
DISTRICT INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT PLAN 2002-2003 (2002) (pamphlet on file with
the North Carolina Law Review); see also THE CHARLES A. DANA CTR., supra note 33, at
3, 6-7 (study identifying seven, and investigating four relatively large (at least 5,000
students) and robustly improving Texas school districts that met demanding selection
criteria; attributing the districts' success to causal clusters that reflect the key aspects of
the reform architecture under discussion here: changes in the accountability system; local
use of information revealed by the accountability system to pressure districts into
improving; the emergence of new reform leaders; the transformation, as a result of all this,
of district organization; and, ultimately, changes in educators' understanding of equity and
excellence); Stephanie Surles, Education Innovation Network, Phase II: Evaluation
Conducted in 2001-2002 9-12, Presentation at the Education Improvement Network
Team Meeting (June 25, 2002) (Power Point presentation on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (describing the capacity-building work of a network of improving school
districts in Texas that are members of the Educational Innovation Network of the Charles
A. Dana Center at the University of Texas, which is described infra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text).
113. See generally THE CHARLES A. DANA CTR., supra note 33, at 3 (studying the
rapidly improving Texas school districts of Aldine., Brazoport, San Benito, and Witchita
Falls).
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provoke halting reforms at the school and district level, such as
monitoring by principals of classroom implementation of curricular
reform.1 14 The upshot is that the lack of a prebuilt culture of reform,
successful program of professional development, or completed
blueprint for restructuring does not disqualify schools or districts
from achieving these results.
This latter suggestion does not mean that governance reform is
self-effectuating in the sense that a once-and-for-all change of
incentives at the top is sufficient to produce real reform at the
bottom. Professor Elmore is right to emphasize the need for
coordinated investments in professional development and other
institutional changes as conditions for the success of the reforms. 5
But if we are accurately interpreting our case studies, they reveal that
schools and districts will be more capable of making these
investments correctly while implementing the NCLB than they were
before its adoption. More speculatively, it may turn out that it is
easier to raise the monies to pay for reform with an effective
accountability system in place than without such a system because the
taxpaying public can tell whether their tax dollars are well spent.
A similar argument about capacity as a property or attribute that
emerges from the process of reform, rather than as a precondition for
it, applies to state-level governance systems. The pessimistic view
compares the current state-level governance capacity to the ideal
envisioned by the NCLB at the point of full national implementation
and concludes that nearly all states are seriously, even fatally,
capacity constrained. But assuming that capacity can be built on the
fly, the NCLB's full-implementation ideal is the wrong baseline for
assessment. On the assumption that it might be possible to build
governance capacity during the implementation of the NCLB, states'
ability to address the prospective governance-capacity gap is more
accurately gauged by looking at their recent responses to demands for
better school governance under any circumstances in which it was
explicitly required.
From that perspective, the situation is delicate but not dire. It is
widely acknowledged that a sea change in state attitudes toward
public education accompanied general acceptance of standards-based
accountability in the early 1990s. "In 1993, when the Clinton
Administration took office," writes Michael Cohen, former Assistant
Secretary of Education in that administration, "only a handful of
114. Id. at 6-7.
115. See Elmore, supra note 89.
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states were developing standards and aligned assessments .... Nine
years later, every state is organizing its K-12 system around
standards-based reform." ' 6 Moreover, there has been a substantial
accumulation of expertise about how to deal with technical problems
of the New Accountability, such as year-to-year volatility in test
scores that is a statistical artifact and not a reflection of actual
changes, and the unreliability of data that is disaggregated by racial
and economic groups with only a few members in given schools.' 17 At
the same time, the successes of states, such as Texas and North
Carolina, in implementing NCLB-style governance reforms have
been widely discussed.1 ' This combination of a general orientation
116. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 4.
117. See sources cited supra notes 15, 16, 61, and 87.
118. E.g., DAVID GRISSMER ET AL., IMPROVING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: WHAT
STATE NAEP TEST SCORES TELL US 58-73 (2000) (finding that NAEP test scores of
public school students in North Carolina and Texas have improved more substantially
than in any other states and linking those successes to the two states' implementation of
systematic reforms); Jonathan Fox, Old-Style Tests May Hamper School Reform, Experts
Say, EDUC. DAILY, Apr. 14, 1999 (crediting the 1995 Texas reform plan with some of "the
highest test score gains this decade on the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP), catapulting [Texas] from lower-than-average NAEP standards to near the
national average"); Improving Student Performance: The Role of District-Level Staff,
EVALUATION BRIEF (Pub. Sch. of N.C., State Bd. of Educ., Raleigh, N.C.), March 2000,
at 5-6, available at http:f/www.ncpublicschools.org/accountability/evaluation/evalbriefs/
vol2n4-role.pdf (identifying schools and districts in the state where minority students have
made large gains over a number of years, or where the achievement gap between white
and black students has been closed, and linking those successes to governmental reform);
Martin Carnoy et al., Do Higher Test Scores in Texas Make for Better High School
Outcomes? 2, Paper presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual
Meeting (Apr. 24-28, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting
generally favorable findings in regard to effect of Texas reforms); Walt Haney, The Myth
of the Texas Miracle in Education, 8 EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, 41 § 3.4 (2000),
at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n41l/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (citing "considerable publicity for the apparent success of education reform in
[Texas]" based on test score data); see ORFIELD & DEBRAY, supra note 59, at 29-32
(noting that Texas had the largest increase on fourth grade mathematics scores between
1992 and 1996 of the thirty-five states participating in the NAEP, although progress in
reading has been roughly average for the country and has not accelerated since 1992); cf
STEPHEN P. KLEIN ET AL., WHAT Do TEST SCORES IN TEXAS TELL US? 12, 13-14 (Rand
Corp., Issue Paper No. IP-202, 2000) (finding that "the reading and math skills of Texas
students improved since the full implementation of the TAAS program in 1994" but
stating that the NAEP and TAAS results give "very different" answers to the questions
"whether the improvement in reading was comparable to what it was in math, and
whether Texas reduced the gap in scores among racial and ethnic groups"). But see, e.g.,
McNeil & Valenzuela, supra note 21, at 147 (concluding that the TAAS test is a "ticket to
nowhere"); Eric A. Hanushek, Deconstructing RAND, EDUC. NEXT, Spring 2001, at 65,
http://www.educationnext.org/2001sp/65.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (criticizing main study touting Texas gains for relying on insufficiently detailed
family backgrounds of Texas students who took the NAEP and doubting conclusions that
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towards standards-based reform, accumulating expertise in the use of
diagnostic data, and leading examples of how to link classroom-level
reform via attention to disaggregated diagnostic data to governance
systems is likely to encourage rapid learning among new generations
of reformers. Rapid learning is especially likely to occur if, as we
expect, the quality of testing and reporting in one state will be a goad
to improvement in others.' 9
There thus is evidence that capacity to reform classrooms and
build governance systems can be built even as reform proceeds. 120
The provision of information on school and district performance in
Texas touched off a statewide movement for school- and district-level
improvement, and there is reason to hope that the provision of
equivalent information through the NCLB will touch off a mutually
reinforcing race to the top nationwide both in statewide school
governance and in district, school, and classroom reform.
But in arguing that the NCLB may set off a race to the top, we
do not suggest that the law as enacted provides all that is required for
a general and continuing improvement of education in all schools and
districts in the country at large. Like all races, races to the top
produce losers as well as winners, even if we know too little about the
enabling conditions of reform to predict who will place where.
Accordingly, we can assume that the NCLB and its implementation
will have to be modified to provide additional, context-driven support
to the stragglers. But, as in the case of the corresponding legislation
in Texas and Kentucky, the NCLB creates a framework that appears
to be corrigible based upon the experience it induces. This next
smaller class size and higher teacher salaries connected with Texas reforms contributed to
increases in NAEP test scores). McNeil and Valenzuela conclude:
The TAAS is harmful to instruction by its rigid format, its artificial treatment of
subject matter, its embodiment of discredited learning theories, its lack of
attention to children's cultures and languages, and its emphasis on the accounting
of prescribed learning. The test itself and the system of testing and test
preparation have in poor and minority schools come to usurp instructional
resources and supplant the opportunity for high-quality, meaningful learning.
McNeil & Valenzuela, supra note 2 1, at 147.
119. Our expectation is shared by private service providers that compete with each
other to assist states in implementing high quality testing and reporting schemes, and that
interest officials in their services in part by identifying states whose schemes do and do not
measure up to those in operation in, for example, Texas and to those contemplated by the
NCLB. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text. For a careful analysis of the often
considerable regulatory value of the release of comparative data on the harmful by-
products and successful self-regulation of regulated entities, see Karkkainen, Information
as Environmental Regulation, supra note 35, at 265.
120. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 54-57, 78-81); THE CHARLES
A. DANA CTR., supra note 33, at 18-19; sources cited supra notes 24, 33, and 112.
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generation of framework reform could be in substantial part the work
of the U.S. Department of Education or of public-private
intermediary groups. Or, as we argue in the next Part, this reform
might emerge in response to community and legal pressure
occasioned by public evaluation of schools, districts, states, and the
federal government itself in the light of the new accountability
systems. And this public engagement may in turn provide new tools
and perhaps even a new direction for the civil rights movement.
For starters, the Federal Department of Education, acting under
its own steam, could periodically convene the states to review
experience under their consolidated plans and to revise their
standards, assessments and accountability systems accordingly. The
Secretary of Education could report the results of this deliberation
periodically to Congress and explain how, through its own
enforcement activities, the Department itself is drawing framework
lessons from developments triggered by the NCLB. Such a process
could in time cause the relationship of the federal government to the
states to approximate the cascading relation of states to school
districts, school districts to schools, and schools to classrooms. In
each case, the higher order unit creates a framework for the initiative
of the lower level ones and an infrastructure that allows the latter to
revise the framework in light of their pooled experience. 2'
V. THE ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL, COMMUNITY, AND CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIVISM
Thus far, we have suggested that the contribution of the New
Accountability and the NCLB to preserving or dooming the public
schools and to closing or maintaining the gap between the educational
outcomes of poor and minority children and those of other children
will depend upon administrative action at the federal, state, and local
levels. The Texas and Kentucky experiences suggest, however, that it
may be possible, and indeed necessary, to build key elements of a
national system of educational accountability without direct action by
the federal government, through the work of nongovernmental,
community, and civil rights activism.
121. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. For thoughtful convergent views of
the possible reorientation of the federal role in educational reform and a concomitant use
of its enforcement policies, see Margaret C. Wang et al., The Need for Developing
Procedural Accountability in Title I Schoolwide Programs, in HARD WORK FOR GOOD
SCHOOLS, supra note 59, at 175, 175-91; Weckstein, supra note 15, at 314-18.
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A. Nongovernmental Organization Monitoring and Benchmarking
In Texas, for example, an intermediary organization, Just for the
Kids, provides parents with the most useful data for building a
constituency for reform and most effectively culls best practices from
the successes of leading schools and districts for use by less successful
institutions."' Another intermediary organization, the Educational
Innovation Network ("EIN") team at the Dana Center of the
University of Texas, links leading districts in a network that facilitates
"inter-visitation" and other forms of ongoing peer review.'23 Just for
the Kids is already making a determined effort to become a national
provider of detailed comparable information on school performance
for districts and states across the nation,'24 and it also is beginning to
coordinate efforts with the Dana Center. Similarly, Education Week
began publishing a report card on state education policy, student
performance, and standards and accountability systems six years
ago.'25 Additionally, academic comparisons of state accountability
and assessment systems are also being published.'26
122. For information about Just for the Kids, see Gwyne, supra note 112; David J.
Hoff, Group to Take Texas Reform Tools Nationwide, EDUC. WK., Nov. 14, 2001,
http://www.edweek.org/ew/ew-printstory.cfm?slug=llecs.h21 (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Bess Keller, Texas Group Makes News with Data, EDUC. WK.,
Nov. 28, 2001, http://www.edweek.org/ew/ew-printstory.cfm?slug=13kids.h21 (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
123. See EDUC. INNOVATION NETWORK, supra note 112. For information on the
Dana Center, see its Web site, http://www.utdanacenter.org/ein/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2003),
and Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 74-78). The authors are currently
collaborating with EIN on a research project designed to measure effective
implementation of reform strategies and to determine whether it is linked to improved
outcomes.
124. As the home page of the Web site of Just for the Kids explains, the organization
"analyze[s] state test data to identify how well individual schools are performing,"
"stud[ies] the highest-performing schools to find out what works," and develops "tools and
instruction [to] help others replicate educational best practice." Just for the Kids, US
Home, at http://www.just4kids.org/us/us-home.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). The organization's Web site already lists the additional
information that each state needs to collect to make Texas-style reporting available there.
See Just for the Kids, New York, at http://www.just4kids.org/us/newyork.asp (last visited
Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
125. See Lori Meyer et al., The State of States, EDUC. WK., Jan. 10, 2002, at 68.
126. E.g., MARGARET E. GOERTZ & MARK C. DUFFY, ASSESSMENT AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACROSS THE 50 STATES 8-12, 18-35 (Consortium for Policy Research
in Educ., Pol'y Briefs No. RB-33, 2001) (presenting detailed comparisons of states based
on how well they: (1) measure student performance and report it to the public; (2) hold
schools and districts accountable for student outcomes; (3) have aligned their
accountability systems for Title I and non-Title I schools; (4) and assist low-performing
schools).
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Presumably, there will be competition among these and other
rating bodies to command national attention and the resources that
go with it.127 Similarly, several competing national analogues to EIN
networks will likely emerge linking high-performance districts and
state education agencies, and these networks are likely to compete
with the rating agencies as providers of best practices and
performance benchmarks to educators and the public.
B. Community Action
Provision of these kinds of services may both emerge from and
contribute to grassroots engagement of parents and students in school
reform. One model of such engagement is the Community
Accountability Team in Louisville, Kentucky. The Team was created
in 1999 with the help of the Prichard Committee, a statewide
advocacy group that had been instrumental in securing legislative
approval and modifications of Kentucky's landmark accountability
reforms.128 The purpose of the Team is to look into the cause of, and
help correct, the persistent achievement gaps between white and
black, male and female, and rich and poor students in the Jefferson
County School District, which encompasses Louisville and its
suburbs.129 Several of the parents, community volunteers, Prichard
Committee members, and business leaders who make up the team are
graduates of the Commonwealth Institute for Parent Leadership,
which the Prichard Committee created two years earlier to train
parents and community activists across the state in building
127. For analogous competition among forestry codes and the learning that occurs
through detailed comparisons of their features as judged by users, see CATHERINE M.
MATER ET AL., CERTIFICATION ASSESSMENTS ON PUBLIC & UNIVERSITY LANDS: A
FIELD-BASED COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL
(FSC) AND THE SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE (SFI) PROGRAMS 3-5, 49-51 (June
2002), available at http://www.pinchot.org/pic/Pinchot-ReportCertificationDual_
Assessment.pdf.
128. Henderson & Raimondo, supra note 43, at 22-23; Press Release, Prichard
Committee for Academic Excellence, Every Child Counts: CAT Team Releases Report
on Jefferson County Middle Schools (Jan. 18, 2001), http://www.prichardcommittee.org/
news/010118catreport.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); JEFFERSON
COUNTY COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM, EVERY CHILD COUNTS: RAISING
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE GRADES 2 (2001), http://www.prichard
committee.org/pubs/cat/every_child.pdf; THE COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE FOR PARENT
LEADERSHIP, PRICHARD COMMITEE FOR ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE, 2000-2001
BIENNIAL REPORT 6, available at http://www.cipl.org/pubs/report2000-2001.pdf.
129. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM, supra note 128, at 2;
LEWIS, supra note 43, at 5-8; Henderson & Raimondo, supra note 43, at 23.
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partnerships with teachers and principals to implement educational
reforms at the local level.130
The Community Accountability Team ("The Team") used the
accountability and assessment framework created by the Kentucky
legislation on school governance to undertake a sustained review of
all of the middle schools in Jefferson County, where the district's
achievement gaps are the greatest. The Team began by
disaggregating the schools' achievement data in a way that has
already become routine in high-performing Texas districts. This step
revealed dramatic disparities in the performance of subpopulations
that previously had escaped attention in a district where aggregate
achievement compares favorably with that in other large urban school
systems. 3' The Team then undertook a "shadowing" study of five
representative middle schools to uncover the reasons for the
differences in performance-again adopting a type of comparative
assessment of school practices that is routine in the robustly
improving districts we observed in Texas and New York City.'32 The
Team's key recommendations were to refocus staff development to
enable teachers to devise engaging lessons linked to demanding
standards and to provide more individualized instruction-structures
and principles, once again, that are regarded as fundamental in
successful Texas districts and in New York City's District 2.133
Insofar as they remain local, movements of this sort may create
pressure and facilitate efforts to improve schools and districts.'34 But
as the connection of the Community Accountability Team to the
Commonwealth Institute for Parent Leadership and the Prichard
Committee suggests, these local movements can also go hand in hand
with movements for reform of the statewide accountability system.'35
Indeed, an upshot of these organizations' work was the passage in
2002 of a law requiring the Kentucky Department of Education to
provide every school in the state with data on student performance on
130. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM, supra note 128, at 2,
12; LEWIS, supra note 43, at 2-4; Henderson & Raimondo, supra note 43, at 23.
131. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM, supra note 128, at 3;
LEWIS, supra note 43, at 5-7; Henderson & Raimondo, supra note 43, at 23.
132. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM, supra note 128, at 3;
LEWIS, supra note 43, at 10-11; Henderson & Raimondo, supra note 43, at 23.
133. JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY TEAM, supra note 128, at
6-7. For an evaluation of the Accountability Team's work by one of its funders, with a
dissenting view contending that the main report unjustly accused Jefferson County School
District officials of tolerating disparate treatment in the past and failing to collaborate
effectively with the Accountability Team, see LEWIS, supra note 43.
134. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 13 (manuscript at 98-99, 109-12).
135. Id.
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statewide tests that is disaggregated by race, sex, and economic
status. 136 In turn, schools are required to involve parents, faculty, and
staff in setting biennial targets for eliminating achievement gaps and
in reviewing and adjusting these plans as needed.137 This measure
does Texas one better by making the data-driven reduction of
achievement gaps a central focus of school organization and
assessment.
Other inchoate but proliferating efforts by community
organizations broadly understood to promote and shape school
reform reveal a variety of horizontal coalitions connecting, for
example, reforming schools and districts in different cities and states,
along with vertical alliances connecting local reform with state and
national efforts. Some of these initiatives are designed to break down
barriers between community groups supposedly interested primarily,
or even exclusively, in school safety and facilities improvement and
reformist professionals ostensibly interested in building learning
communities based on new forms of professional collaboration. For
example, the Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform, an
alliance of school reform organizations in Baltimore, Chicago,
Denver, New York, Oakland, and other major cities, is defining
indicators of school improvement that reflect the "reciprocal
accountability" of community activists and professional reformers in
the new setting of standards-based reform.138
Another careful and incisive effort to locate the common ground
between school reformers and community parents is the Research for
Democracy project. This project is jointly directed by the Temple
University Center for Public Policy and the Eastern Pennsylvania
Organizing Project, a coalition of community and faith-based
democratic organizations working for neighborhood improvement in
Philadelphia.'39 Instead of focusing on the views of representative
institutions-community-based organizations on the one hand and the
136. Act of Apr. 9, 2002, ch. 302, § 1, 2002 KY. REV. STAT. & R. SERV. 972, 972
(Banks-Baldwin) (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.649 (Supp. 2002)). Here, as
elsewhere, economic status is determined based on whether students qualify for the hot
lunch program.
137. Id. § 1, 2002 KY. REV. STAT. & R. SERV. at 973.
138. EVA GOLD & ELAINE SIMON, RESEARCH FOR ACTION, SUCCESSFUL
COMMUNITY ORGANIZING FOR SCHOOL REFORM, STRONG NEIGHBORHOODS, STRONG
SCHOOLS (Mar. 2002) (describing community intervention efforts linked to standards-
based reforms in six major urban school districts), available at http://www.crosscity.org/
pdfs/strnbrhdsstrschls.pdf; see also Executive Summary, BEYOND FINGER-POINTING AND
TEST SCORES iii-xii, xix-xx, available at http://www.crosscity.org/pdfs/beyondfinger.pdf.
139. See Eastern Philadelphia Organizing Project, http://www.epopleaders.org/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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elite school reformers on the other-Research for Democracy
conducted a random survey in Philadelphia in 2002 of the underlying
constituencies of both types of groups: parents and school teachers.
Based on the survey, the researchers concluded that "the traditional
view of parents as only concerned with safety and building conditions
is inaccurate.' 140  Perhaps most surprising is the finding that
Philadelphia parents have substantially more ambitious educational
goals for their children than do their teachers. More than eighty
percent of parents thought that schools should put more emphasis on
teaching students to think critically and preparing them for college,
whereas only forty percent of the teachers agreed with this
assessment. 4' A deep divide over the importance of educational
enhancement may thus run within the professional community itself,
rather than between communities and reforming schools; and the
efforts of groups, such as the Cross City Campaign and Research for
Democracy, may therefore prove crucial to creating the parent-
professional collaborations through which, and the resulting political
context within which, reform can flourish.
Something analogous could be emerging at the national level.
Groups, such as the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights (a
collaborator with Research for Democracy in the Philadelphia
parent-teacher survey discussed above), are comparing states' ability
to meet the new federal accountability requirements.'42 The Citizens'
Commission also advises advocates on the use of the Act's
information-disclosure provisions in assessing school performance,
and on the use of data-rich studies of rapidly improving schools in
pressuring less successful schools.'43  In time, the Citizens'
Commission and other organizations like it might provide just the
kinds of services to subnational advocacy groups that the Prichard
Commission is beginning to provide to local advocacy groups in
Kentucky.
Together or separately, these new publics could lead the Federal
Department of Education to take a more active role in monitoring
school reform under the NCLB than the legislation now mandates.
Alternatively, the government could partner with some of the new
140. RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY, supra note 43, at 17.
141. Id. at 21-22.
142. See RAISING STANDARDS, supra note 43, at 18-27; sources cited supra notes 8, 13;
Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights Web site, at http://www.cccr.org (last visited Apr. 1,
2003).
143. See CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 38, 42-43; RAISING
STANDARDS, supra note 43, at 15, 32-36.
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entities that are already monitoring school reform. If the government
fails to act, a national coalition of these entities could urge Congress
to amend the NCLB to require federal officials to act.
C. Civil Rights Activism Through the Courts
The political correctives to the NCLB could be supplemented by
new, accountability-based variants of the legal strategies developed
by the Civil Rights Movements over a half century ago. And those
strategies can then be used to enhance the NCLB's enforcement
regime.
A first potential strategy builds on the tradition of private
litigation by aggrieved parties vindicating civil rights under the equal
protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'" and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' 4 which forbids racial
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Under both the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI, privately enforceable claims require
proof that, as a result of deliberate discrimination, a minority group
has suffered harm from the racially disparate impact of a government
policy.14 6 Proving intentional discrimination directly is, of course,
nearly impossible. Few bigots with official responsibility are
foolhardy enough to make bigotry an express motive for their official
acts. In most cases, therefore, racial animus must be proved
circumstantially: Officials may be found to be deliberately
discriminating if they adopt policies with racially disparate impacts
when they know of, but ignore, at least equally beneficial alternatives
to the chosen policies that would have avoided or moderated the
disparities.1 47
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
146. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81, 289-91 (2001) (limiting private
actions under Title VI to deliberate discrimination, which also is required to establish a
violation of the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment).
147. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-27 (1982) (upholding a vote dilution
challenge to a facially neutral at-large election system based on a variety of circumstantial
indications of discriminatory intent); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536
n.9 (1979) (noting that "proof of foreseeable consequences is one type of quite relevant
evidence of racially discriminatory purpose"); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 461-62, 464-65 (1979) (recognizing that "foreseeable and anticipated disparate
impact" is relevant evidence to prove discriminatory purpose); Vill. of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) (describing circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory purpose, including patterns of disparate impact, the historical
background of legislative decisions, and procedural or substantive departures from typical
governmental practices and decisions); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-43 (1976)
(stating that discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances, including the disparate impact of a facially neutral statute); James S.
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The accountability systems required by the NCLB can greatly
facilitate such circumstantial demonstrations of intentional
discrimination. Until now, circumstantial claims of racial
discrimination were necessarily conjectural. Courts could never be
sure there was a feasible alternative to the impugned policy that
would more nearly equalize the benefits of a government service
across all protected groups. But the whole thrust of the NCLB and
the New Accountability is to make both the public and school
officials inescapably aware of such proven equality-enhancing
alternatives. Under the NCLB, schools and districts are required to
(1) bring all subpopulations of students up to a state-defined level of
educational adequacy and (2) improve the performance of those
subpopulations at a threshold rate defined by state law; and states are
routinely required to (3) divide those institutions into similarly
situated cohorts (ones with racially and socioeconomically
comparable student bodies), and (4) publicly identify the institutions
in each cohort that do and do not satisfy those adequacy and
improvement requirements. Given these mandates and the
information they generate, the difficult burden will no longer be the
one on the plaintiff class of minority children to show that school
officials willingly ignored policies and practices that are
demonstrability superior based on the school system's own criteria.
Information generated by the state's own accountability system will
do this for the plaintiffs. The more demanding burden will be the one
the administrative scheme itself places on persistently poorly
performing schools and districts: to explain to courts and
administrators why they have not been able to meet the state's
adequacy and improvement goals for their students when schools that
the state and federal legislatures have formally defined to be similarly
situated (ethnically, economically, and the like) are able to do so.148
Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1463, 1576 n.483 (1990) (listing types of circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
intent that the courts have recognized and citing lower court cases). See generally John
Benjes et al., The Legality of Minimum Competency Test Programs Under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 537, 594-604 (1980) (arguing that
past intentional discrimination raises the presumption that present disparate impact is
causally connected to past discrimination and discussing the viability of equal protection
challenges to minimum competency tests based on this and other circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory purpose).
148. This same argument works to the advantage of minority plaintiffs in suits filed
under state analogues to the federal Equal Protection Clause in those states-the
majority-where such provisions likewise require proof of intentional discrimination.
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The NCLB may also smooth the way for litigants pursuing relief
through two additional types of causes of action under which a
showing of "disparate impact," regardless of official intent, is
sufficient to establish liability. The first cause of action is available in
suits brought by the U.S. Department of Education to enforce its
longstanding regulations'49 permitting the government to withhold
federal funds from schools, districts, and states whose programs have
harmful disparate impacts on minority children. The Supreme Court
has explicitly left these regulations intact and invited the department
to continue enforcing them through law suits and administrative
actions.150  The second cause of action is available in a minority of
states, where disparate impact is an alternative basis for relief under
their state equal protection clauses.' 5 '
The typical response of defendant officials in pure disparate-
impact cases has been to attribute uneven outcomes to the individual
motivations of poorly performing students or to the inadequate
endowments of their families and communities, thus absolving state
actors of responsibility. 5 2 Under the NCLB, however, state actors are
required to acknowledge their responsibility to enable all
subpopulations of students to reach threshold levels of performance
and ongoing improvement. Moreover, the fact that some schools and
149. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82 (citing and discussing the relevant regulations).
150. Id. at 279-81, 289-91 (limiting private, but not public, actions under Title VI to
deliberate discrimination).
151. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that Connecticut
has an affirmative responsibility under the state's constitution to remedy segregation in
public schools regardless of whether segregation has occurred de jure or de facto); Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1144 & n.60 (1999) (citing cases); Molly S. McUsic, The
Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance
Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM, supra note 12, at 88, 103-04 & n.93 (citing state
cases); Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational Rights
Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 844-54 (1998)
(discussing the interpretation of the equality provision in New Jersey's Constitution);
Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the
State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 301 (1977) (citing cases).
152. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87-97 (1995) (discussing circumstances in
which a school district operating under a desegregation order may establish compliance,
notwithstanding continuing racial disparities, by linking those disparities to conditions
beyond its control); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992) (noting that demographic
changes sometimes cause racial imbalance in a school district that is not attributable to
school officials); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 243 (1991) (concluding that the
residential and resulting school segregation in the Oklahoma School District was the result
of private decisionmaking and economics, not state action); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 416 (1977) (absolving school boards of responsibility for
segregation that is not the result of the board's conduct of its business).
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districts fail to do so while comparable institutions are succeeding is
conclusive proof under the NCLB that it is the former institutions'
corrigible educational practices, not children, parents, and
communities, that are to blame for their pupils' racially disparate
outcomes."'
In urging passage of the NCLB, the Bush Administration
characterized the legislation as an attack on the "soft bigotry of low
expectations" and "committed [the government] to eliminating the
achievement gap, not hiding it within school or statewide averages."' 54
In keeping with these undertakings, the NCLB subverts many of the
traditional defenses to racially disparate outcomes. These
undertakings also arguably place a special responsibility on the U.S.
Department of Education to interpret and enforce its own regulations
in this spirit.
The same logic applies in spades with respect to suits premised
on a state constitutional right to an adequate education. 5 5 We saw
earlier how rulings in Texas and Kentucky solve the justiciability
problem long associated with claims that the state has failed to
provide adequate levels of education. 156  The NCLB now makes it
incumbent on all states to define educational adequacy, to describe
and measure sufficient progress towards it, and to make (via the
accountability system) institutional corrections when the progress is
insufficient. Each step that states take to comply with these
requirements provides plaintiffs in failing schools and districts, and
judges adjudicating their claims, with the definition of an adequate
education and possible ways of achieving it. By provoking states to
153. See supra notes 60-77 and accompanying text (discussing relevant provisions of
NCLB).
154. Reaching Out ... Raising African American Achievement, No Child Left Behind
Fact Sheet, available at http://www.nclb.gov/start/facts..pdf/achievementgap-aa.pdf (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
155. See, e.g., William H. Clune, The Shift from Equity to Adequacy in School Finance,
8 EDUC. POL'Y 376 (1994) (describing a shift in education reform litigation from equity in
school finance to the adequacy of school performance); Michael Heise, State Constitutions,
School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE
L. REV. 1151 (1995) (arguing that "as a tool to reform school finance systems, adequacy
arguments are comparatively less threatening and more firmly rooted in a constitutional
base"); Hershkoff, supra note 151, at 1186-91 (finding that "state courts increasingly rely
on a consequentialist approach to review the sufficiency of public school systems under
state education clauses"); Deborah A. Verstagen, Judicial Analysis During the New Wave
of School Finance Litigation: The New Adequacy in Education, 24 J. EDUC. FIN. 51 (1998)
(concluding that most state courts have understood the concept of an adequate education
as going well beyond a basic or minimum educational program).
156. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
1746 [Vol. 81
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
provide that definition, the NCLB once again removes what in the
past has been a major obstacle to successful adequacy suits. 157
Finally, this change of evidentiary contexts may invigorate
private tort claims in education that until now have proved singularly
unsuccessful. Modeled on medical and legal malpractice suits, these
actions typically have sought monetary damages based on claims that
individual teachers and principals breached professional duties of
care by, for example, authorizing a functionally illiterate student to be
passed up through the grades and awarded a high school diploma.15
Courts almost always rejected these claims on the ground that in
teaching, unlike in medicine and law, there is no settled view-not
even within particular communities-of the due standard of care.'59
Again, however, the whole thrust of the classroom-level reforms
prompted by the NCLB and the New Accountability is precisely to
establish local and statewide standards of professional care, even as
the focus of responsibility shifts from individual teachers to more
encompassing institutions. It is conceivable, therefore, that a new
generation of educational tort claims might be used to obtain
injunctive relief from failing educational institutions. To underscore
the legitimacy and utility of these standards, these suits can refer
directly to the NCLB, to the obligations that states assume in
accepting funds under it, and to state legislation or regulations
adopted to implement those obligations.
For each of these litigation strategies, the NCLB and associated
state reforms provide the same compelling enforcement logic: Failing
schools and districts are now required by federal and state law to
learn from other institutions that are demographically like themselves
but are doing better. Schools and districts that persistently fail at this
manifestly feasible task are reconstituted. 160 An equivalent logic can
also be applied to state educational administrations that are found to
be similarly failing in whole or in part.161  By relying on the
157. See James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political
Reorganization, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA.
L. REV. 349,414-15 (1990).
158. John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for Educational Harms Caused by
Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 693-97 (1978); see Gershon M.
Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills,
63 TEx. L. REV. 777, 851-58 (1985).
159. Liebman, supra note 157, at 385-97.
160. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
161. For discussions of educational reform litigation that could be enhanced by the
strategies discussed here, see, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, School Finance Reform and the
Alabama Experience, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY: CREATING PRODUCTIVE
SCHOOLS IN A JUST SOCIETY 24, 35 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998) (discussing recent
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responsibilities and information generated by state accountability
systems adopted pursuant to the NCLB, courts can thus enforce
rights and remedies that are more encompassing, and yet less
intrusive and difficult for courts to determine, than has typically been
true of earlier phases of educational reform litigation.162
CONCLUSION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT REVISITED
From the vantage point established here, the NCLB may give the
Civil Rights Movement that rarest of gifts: a historic second chance.
As observers starting with W.E.B. DuBois have noted, formal equal
access to public schooling does not by itself secure equality of
educational outcomes. 163 The civil rights community has long been
divided between those who emphasize the first (hoping that it will
produce the second) and those who reverse the emphasis. 64 For
educational reform litigation in Alabama state courts); Liebman, supra note 157, at 370-
435 (proposing litigation strategies designed to extract justiciable standards from high-
stakes testing); James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation and School Finance Litigation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 537 (1999) (discussing recent educational reform litigation in
Connecticut state courts, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996)); Weckstein,
supra note 15, at 314-18 (proposing litigation strategies geared to changes made by a 1994
federal act that is a precursor to the NCLB).
162. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text. Because of the difficulty of
implying a right of action under federal legislation, we have not discussed suits filed in
federal court to enforce the NCLB directly. Two suits attempting to do just that in actions
filed in state court under a combination of federal and state causes of action are
Californians for Justice Education Fund v. California State Board of Education, Case No.
CPF-03-502274 (California Super. Ct. for City and County of San Francisco, filed Jan. 23,
2003) (seeking an order directing the California State Board of Education and the
California Department of Education to follow requirements of the NCLB and the
California Administrative Procedure Act in adopting a definition for a "highly qualified
teacher"), and Staton v. New York City Department of Education, Index No. 101491/2003
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, filed Jan. 28, 2003) (suing two New York districts to enforce
parents' right under the NCLB to transfer their children out of failing schools and to
receive supplemental educational services for their children).
163. In DuBois's view, "[a] mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with
hostile public opinion, and no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is bad." W.E.B.
DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDuC. 328, 335 (1935). He
might well have extended the point to mixed schools with racially segregated tracks,
classrooms, and in-class groupings. DuBois also recognized that "[a] segregated school
with ignorant placeholders, inadequate equipment, poor salaries, and wretched housing, is
equally bad," and that "[olther things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more
natural basis for the education of all youth" because "[i]t gives wider contacts; it inspires
greater self-confidence; and suppresses the inferior complex." Id. Given, however, that
"things seldom are equal," DuBois opted for improved but separate schools. Id. The
hope expressed here is that the New Accountability reforms and the NCLB offer a
mechanism for making those other things equal.
164. Compare Brest, supra note 4 (arguing that an antidiscrimination principle focused
on treating individuals as equals without insisting upon equal results rectifies racial
injustices without subordinating other important values), with Bell, supra note 3 (arguing
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reasons we need not rehearse, the movement opted primarily for the
first strategy and got too little of the benefits of either. The NCLB
presents a historic opportunity to fight on favorable terms for the
second strategy in a way that could redefine, and is likely to increase
its ability to fight for, the first.
In voicing this hope, we no doubt slight the obstacles and enlarge
the gains to such a reconceptualization of the role of the courts. But
even a much more cautious reading than our own of the NCLB, and
the New Accountability generally, reveals possibilities for reform
denied by a view of the Act as another nail in the coffin of the hope
for racial justice in American schools. Imperfect as the NCLB is, it
provides some of the crucial tools for overcoming its own defects. In
a world where even the most effective reformers never get all they
want all at once, this feature of the Act alone should compel serious
attention.'65 One thing is for sure: Unless the civil rights community
is as willing as other actors in school reform to scrutinize, and
scrutinize anew, the relations of its traditional ends to its traditional
legal means, 66 it risks losing a historic opportunity to use the courts to
reinvigorate the heritage of Brown.
that school plans focusing on educational components and educational outcomes are
superior to plans focusing on "racial-balance").
165. On the dangers of aiming to solve major social problems once and for all, see the
failure of the recent effort to give the Federal Food and Drug Administration full
authority to regulate tobacco products. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, SMOKE IN THEIR EYES:
LESSONS IN MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP FROM THE TOBACCO WARS 255-98 (2001).
166. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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